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CHAPTER I
“ONE OF THE BULWARKS OF AMERICAN LIBERTY” 1: THE LEGAL AND
HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP OF EX PARTE MILLIGAN.

On a clear, crisp December morning in 1862, Judge David Davis of the Illinois 8th
Judicial Circuit climbed the steps of the U.S. Capitol building to be sworn in as the next
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. His three-hundred pound frame
carried a large round head, set upon a short neck. His forehead was high, thinly shaded
by gray-brown hair. His full broad, double chinned face was clean shaven, down to a rim
of light-gray whiskers, which ran around from ear to ear under his jaw.2
At twelve o’clock noon, he followed Chief Justice Roger B. Taney and his
associates in a procession into the chamber of the Supreme Court. Taney unrolled a
parchment announcing that they had received the commission of David Davis, and
ordered it read by the clerk. The Chief Justice then asked, “Is Mr. Davis ready to take the
oath?” Davis bowed his head, took the parchment, read it, and kissed the Bible. He then

1

Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Company, 1935), 427.
2
Harry E. Pratt, “David Davis” (PhD diss., University of Illinois, 1930), 118.
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adjourned into the corridor where he was robed in fourteen yards of black silk. The
Court rose as the U.S. Marshal escorted Davis to his seat on the extreme left of the Chief
Justice. The justices all bowed, he bowed in response, then took his seat.3 For the next
fifteen years David Davis helped interpret and frame the supreme law of the land. Over
the course of the American Civil War he had evolved into an eminent jurist, devoted to
defending the civil liberties of Northern citizens. After directly intervening on behalf of
several Northern Peace Democrats who faced trial by military commission, Davis struck
down the use of these tribunals in the landmark case ex parte Milligan.
This thesis will attempt to place the 1866 Supreme Court case ex parte Milligan
and its author, David Davis, in the historical context of the American Civil War and
Reconstruction. It is a story of vital importance to both legal historians and Civil War-era
historians. Davis’s letters and papers have been reexamined with particular attention to
his political views and his development as a judge and civil libertarian. Radical
Republican reaction to Milligan in both newspapers and the Congressional Globe have
also been reevaluated to better understand the Radicals’ interpretation of Davis’s majority
opinion. While Radical Republicans viewed ex parte Milligan as both a condemnation of
the Lincoln administration’s use of military commissions during the Civil War and as an
attack on Congressional Reconstruction, ironically Davis did not intend for his ruling to
apply to the Reconstruction South where he thought the use of military commissions
might remain constitutional. As a common law, circuit court judge, Davis became
increasingly concerned with civil liberties issues during the Civil War and directly

3

Pratt, “David Davis,”119.
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intervened on behalf of Peace Democrats who faced many of these violations. This did
not mean he opposed a vigorous pursuit of military reconstruction in the post-war South.
Simultaneously, this study will follow Davis’s growing anti-Partyism over the
course of his life and career, thus explaining, in part, his opposition to both Radical
Republicans and Peace Democrats. This anti-Partyism also explains why he was able to
rise above the political fray and stand up for the civil liberties of Peace Democrats and
why, in Milligan, he did not go so far as to prohibit Radical-backed military commissions
in the South. He consistently maintained a judicial middle-ground. The problem with the
existing literature of David Davis, ex parte Milligan, and the judicial politics of
Reconstruction, is that historians have failed to place Davis and his majority opinion in
the historical framework of civil liberties during the Civil War and Reconstruction. This
work intends to fill that scholarly void.
On December 17, 1866, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
landmark decision in ex parte Milligan, declaring that the military trial of civilians was
unconstitutional when the civilian courts were open and functioning.4 Sixty-nine years
later, in 1935, legal historian Charles Warren hailed the decision as “one of the bulwarks
of American civil liberties” and paid equal homage to its author, Justice David Davis.5
Despite being issued a year after the American Civil War, Ex parte Milligan has
been often cited in subsequent legal cases in order to check presidential actions during
wartime in the interest of protecting civil liberties. It can be said that the decision in Ex

4
5

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6 (1866).
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, 427.
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parte Milligan was not settled in 1866 and, in recent Supreme Court decisions regarding
military commissions, remains unsettled. As legal scholar Curtis Bradley has noted,
“The extent to which Milligan restricted military jurisdiction was unclear even at the time
of the decision…[a]pplying the decision a century and a half later…in the wake of
significant intervening precedent and substantial changes in the nature of the country and
of the world, leaves substantial room for judicial discretion.”6 This judicial discretion, as
we will see, has led to broadly different interpretations and applications of Milligan. In
addition to legal precedent, there are two other sources for the case’s interpretation:
constitutional scholarship and legal history.
Since the case was handed down in 1866, there has been a long and complicated
history of attorneys and judges interpreting Milligan where it has been cited in
subsequent legal cases relating to presidential war powers, the role of courts during
wartime, and even the classification of non-traditional combatants.7 Shadowing this
battle in the courts, legal scholars and historians continued to write about Milligan from
widely diverging points of view and for a variety of reasons. It is therefore vital to
understand the difference between legal scholarship and historical scholarship and how
they intersect within legal history. Legal scholars associated with law schools, such as
Dan Farber and Paul Finkelman tend to focus on constitutional law and theory. They see
law as fundamentally different from politics. As legal historian Michael Les Benedict

Curtis A. Bradley, “The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy Combatants, and
Congressional Authorization” in Presidential Power Stories, eds. Christopher H. Schroeder and Curtis A.
Bradley (St. Paul: Foundation Press, 2009), 130.
7
See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1945), Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), Hamdi v.
Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th
Cir. 2005), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
6
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aptly explains, “[P]olitics is about the exercise of power, while law is about the
application of rules.”8 From this particular perspective, after the political process has
established a constitutional provision, its legal interpretation is left to the judiciary.
Therefore, in the context of the Constitution, legal scholars have determined the “original
intent” of the framers and how judges today should interpret constitutional law in a 21st
century society.9 This dichotomy between politics and law will be extremely important
to remember when we explore Davis’s own views on how politics and law interacted
with one another. Davis himself strove to rise above the political fray when considering
the application and interpretation of law. Whether he was successful in doing so, will be
explored in the coming chapters.
Legal historians, conversely, do not study legal history for legal purposes, but to
understand why things happened the way they did and how they have affected the
subsequent course of events. Possessing a wider vision of constitutional politics, legal
historians see the framing and consequences of Civil War and Reconstruction era law as
part of a much longer and broader political process in which judges played a smaller role.
Thus, constitutional law is one piece in the larger puzzle of our constitutional system. As
Benedict again notes, “Even the histories of the Reconstruction era that attend the most
closely to constitutional issues do not try to tease out exact understandings and intentions

8

Michael Les Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: Essays on Politics and the Constitution in
the Reconstruction Era (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), ix.
9
Benedict, Preserving the Constitution, ix-x.
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[of the framers].”10 In other words, judges were creating new law rather than interpreting
old law.
As noted earlier, after Milligan was handed down in 1866, the case lay dormant
for an extended period of time. In the years after Reconstruction, few legal situations
arose in which military commissions were deemed necessary; however, in the waning
years of the 19th century, historians and political scientists began to examine the Civil
War within the halls of the academy. Twenty-two years after Milligan, historian William
A. Dunning, John Burgess, and Sydney Fisher gave their analysis of the case. In 1887,
Dunning, who greatly influenced later generations of Reconstruction scholars, noted how
the use of military commissions remained unchecked by the Supreme Court throughout
the war. Dunning saw this as the Court being intimated by the Radicals. Milligan, he
concluded, provided an opportunity for the Court to reassert its judicial authority. He
labeled the Milligan case, therefore, an act of “judicial hostility to Congress.”11 This
thesis views Dunning’s assertion that the Court had been intimidated by the Radicals and
hostile towards Congress as somewhat exaggerated. While Davis did make an obiter
dicta statement against Congressional power to establish military commissions, as an
obiter dicta statement, it was not binding. Obviously he was hostile toward Congress, yet
this did not mean that Davis opposed the use of military commissions in the South.

10

Ibid., x.
William A. Dunning, “The Constitution of the United States in Reconstruction,” Political
Science Quarterly 2 (December 1887): 558-602, quoted in Peter J. Barry, “Ex parte Milligan: History and
Historians,” Indiana Magazine of History 4 (December 2013), 362.
11
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Indeed, Davis left the authority of military commissions in the South
unchallenged. In defense of arbitrary power during war, political essayist Sydney Fisher
stated in 1888 that:
It is generally admitted that when a government is attacked
by a rebellion it is impossible for it to protect itself from
conspirators and assassins if every one of them has to be
taken before a court of law and proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. In such a crisis some arbitrary power
must be given.

Fisher saw Milligan playing “havoc with the theories that prevailed during the war.”12
Burgess also wrote a pessimistic assessment of Milligan’s long-term authority. In 1891
he wrote, “It is devoutly to be hoped that the decision of the court may never be subject
to the strain of actual war. If, however, it should be, we may safely predict that it will be
necessarily disregarded.”13 These comments have proven prophetic. Instead of focusing
on Milligan’s impact on Reconstruction, however, Fisher and Burgess established a
conversation about Milligan’s impact on America’s legal apparatus involving civilians
and military relations during wartime. That conversation would remain unchanged for
generations to come. This study will attempt to shift that conversation away from a legal
and political theory context and toward an historical context in which David Davis,
Milligan, and the Civil War era are studied as a whole.

12
Sydney G. Fisher, “The Suspension of Habeas Corpus During the War of the Rebellion,”
Political Science Quarterly 3 (September 1888): 478, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 363.
13
John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (Boston: Ginn &
Company, 1891): 251, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 362.
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Understandably, early 20th century historians continued the discussion of Milligan
during World War I. However, an historical analysis of the case, specifically in regards
to how it affected Reconstruction and David Davis’s role, was still absent from the
scholarly conversation. The discussion still centered on a strictly legal viewpoint.
Several legal scholars responded to Congress when it amended the Articles of War to
guarantee the authority of military commissions during World War I. University of
Minnesota Law Professor Henry J. Fletcher commented on the Milligan case in 1917
stating, “Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial
process.”14 Conversely, in his 1920 book, Freedom of Speech, Harvard Law Professor
and civil libertarian Zechariah Chafee Jr. firmly believed that the Bill of Rights should
hold under both war and peace and cited Milligan as a part of this fundamental principle.
“A majority of the Supreme Court declared the war power of Congress to be restricted by
the Bill of Rights in ex parte Milligan, which cannot be lightly brushed aside.”15 This is
the same reasoning that Davis took in his majority opinion. Perhaps the most influential
and comprehensive work on the legal history of the Civil War and Reconstruction is J.G.
Randall’s 1926 book Constitutional Problems under Lincoln. In regards to the split
between Davis’s majority opinion in Milligan which declared Congress did not have
power to authorize military commissions outside a war zone and Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase’s concurring opinion which would have upheld Congressional but not executive
power to establish home-front military commissions. Randall observed that this left “the

14
Henry J. Fletcher, “The Civilian and the War Power,” Minnesota Law Review 2 (1917): 130,
quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 364.
15
Zechariah Chafee Jr., Freedom of Speech (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920): 33,
quoted in Barry: “Ex parte Milligan,” 364.
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impression of a court about to swing from one opinion to another.”16 As we will see, this
split, in fact, was the hinge upon which Milligan decidedly affected Reconstruction. If
one accepts the premise that Chase was representative of Radical Republicans, Davis
provides an opposing view to Congressional Radicals and their constitutional authority
during Reconstruction. Yet, as we will see, Davis’s and Chase’s opinions were not all
that different. The “split” as Randall observed, came down to a misinterpretation of
where Davis objected to the use of military commissions.
In 1929, legal scholar Samuel Klaus published a seminal piece The Milligan Case,
which included the proceedings of the military commission that tried Milligan and the
briefs submitted to the United States Supreme Court. Klaus minimized the significance
of the case by citing a 60 year span of time marked by no situation that dictated the
suspension of habeas corpus or the trial of civilians by military commissions. Klaus
asserted, “It is precisely for this rare and crucial situation that Ex Parte Milligan purports
to assert a rule of judicial decision.”17 This thesis, however, will argue that the
significance of Milligan does not reside in its standing as legal precedent as Klaus and his
predecessors have contended. Milligan’s significance resides more generally as a part of
the evolution of civil liberties thinking in the North coming out of the Civil War and is
thus of enormous historical significance, despite its legal obscurity.

16
James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1926): 176, quoted in Barry: “Ex parte Milligan,” 365.
17
Samuel Klaus, ed., The Milligan Case (New York: Knopf, 1929): 62, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte
Milligan,” 366.
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Ironically, that “rare and crucial situation,” as Klaus put it, came quickly with the
advent of World War II. Attorney and civil libertarian John P. Frank took a favorable
position on Milligan in 1944. In “Ex Parte Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial Law
in Hawaii,” Frank, repeated Charles Fairman, in stating that the Milligan opinion was a
“bulwark for the protection of the civil liberties of every American citizen.”18 He
concluded that the U.S. Constitution applied in Hawaii and, therefore, the military trials
of civilians on the island were illegal. Once again, finding answers to military authority
during wartime precluded any historical scholarship on Milligan, David Davis, and the
Civil War era. Failing to contextualize Milligan properly during the Civil War and
Reconstruction left out an entirely new and significant perspective on how law and
politics interacted.
The Cold War again provided a period in which the question of military trials of
civilians was temporarily put to rest. Because there were no active hostilities during this
period, military commissions were not called upon to try civilians. However, 1960s
liberalism placed Milligan back onto the examination table. Although not a figure of the
1960s, but rather a mid-century intellectual, Allan Nevins saw Lambdin P. Milligan as
simply a “loose cannon” in an era of sectionalism and did not deserve historical attention.
Nevins’s characterization of Lambdin P. Milligan as unimportant has largely been
discredited by today’s expanding historical scholarship on Peace Democrats and the
Northern war resistance. Much of this will be explored in chapter 2. According to

John P. Frank, “Ex Parte Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii,” Columbia
Law Review 44 (September 1944): 639, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 368.
18
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Nevins though, the political situation that created the case was more important. He
explained, “Although Lincoln was the last man in the world to make himself such a
despot, he might conceivably have a successor someday who, unless a clear line were
drawn, would permit the erection of a martial autocracy. The line was now emphatically
delineated.”19 In other words, Milligan created a legal barricade for any future president
who might want to expand military rule even further than what it had been during the
Civil War.
In his 1968 book, Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics, revisionist
historian Stanley Kutler challenged Dunning’s opinion that the Court had been
intimidated by the Radical Republicans. Rather, the Court conducted itself with
“forcefulness and not timidity, by judicious self-imposed restraint rather than retreat, by
boldness and defiance instead of cowardice and impotence.”20 Milligan, therefore, was a
reflection of the Court’s attempt to reassert its constitutional authority and to preserve
civil liberties in the framework of American government by striking down expanded
executive and legislative power. Like his predecessors, however, Kutler left the story of
Milligan’s impact on Reconstruction untold. This thesis comes closest to finishing
Kutler’s story: the Court did show “judicious self-imposed restraint.” Davis’s majority
opinion in Milligan did preserve civil liberties in America by striking down military
commissions. I contend, however, that by intent Milligan only applied to the North.

19
Allan Nevins, “The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator,” in Quarrels That Have Shaped the
Constitution, ed. John A Garraty (New York: Harper, 1964): 108, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,”
370.
20
Stanley Kutler, Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1968): 92, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 370.
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Considering his opposition to Radical Republicans, Davis showed great self-restraint
when he allowed Radical-backed military commissions in the South to remain in place.
In 1970, archivist Joseph P. Gambone confirmed Kutler’s impression of
Milligan’s importance for judicial supremacy and civil liberties. He concluded, “By
virtue of the Milligan decision, the Supreme Court restored itself to a position of greater
prestige, and reaffirmed its position as the ‘final arbiter of the Constitution’”21 This was
a part of a larger process that was rapidly resulting in the rise of judicial supremacy in the
late nineteenth century. Charles Fairman revisited the Milligan case in 1971 whereby he
largely reiterated his analysis in 1942. However, he qualified his earlier findings by
stating that “the very words of the Milligan opinion should not be taken as precise test for
all future emergencies.”22 In other words, judges may, over time, contemplate different
applications of Milligan to new military or national security situations. For legal scholars
then, this is the heart of evolving legal interpretation. Yet, the historical significance of
Milligan and its author in the context of the Civil War and Reconstruction has yet to be
explored.
Another decade would pass before a historian would again take up the question of
Milligan’s historical significance. In regards to the author of Milligan, historian Harold
Hyman declared in 1982 declared that “Justice Davis paid the Bill of Rights such respects
as had not sounded in the chamber since Taney’s tribute to the Fifth Amendment in Dred

21
Joseph G. Gambone, “Ex Parte Milligan: The Restoration of Judicial Prestige?” Civil War
History 16 (September, 1970): 259, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 371.
22
Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1971), 233.

12

Scott.”23 Hyman’s statement was deeply ironic given that Taney declared the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited the federal government from freeing
slaves brought into federal territory.24 The only other Bill of Rights case that came
before the Supreme Court, prior to the Civil War, was Barron v. Baltimore (1833). In
this case, the Court declared that the Bill of Rights could not be applied to state
governments.25 Nonetheless, Davis in his majority opinion would use the Due Process
Clause (in part) to strike down the use of military commissions in the North. Starting
with Nevins, historical analysis of Milligan finally started to take hold. Yet, the analysis
was focused on the case’s place in antebellum legal history and its impact on the
Supreme Court’s authority. This was very useful but scholars still had not addressed the
case’s impact on the civil liberties issues coming out of the Civil War, Davis’s role, or the
way the Reconstruction political context might provide a key to its meaning.
Legal historian, Mark Neely Jr., explored the “irrelevancy” of the decision in his
1991 treatise, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties. He concluded
that the 1866 case was inapplicable during wartime, since it was decided during
peacetime. Therefore, “the real legacy of Ex Parte Milligan is confined between the
covers of constitutional history books. The decision itself had little effect on history.”26
This thesis directly challenges Neely’s assertion. As the story unfolds in the proceeding
chapters, David Davis and Milligan had a significant impact on Reconstruction, not in the

23

Harold Hyman and William M. Weicek, Equal Justice Under the Law: Constitutional
Development, 1835-1875 (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 382.
24
Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
25
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
26
Mark Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991): 184, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 374.
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opinion itself but rather in the way Radical Republicans viewed the opinion as an attack
on Congressional Reconstruction.
Five years later, in 1996, Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s All
the Laws but One provided a unique perspective on Milligan. He concluded that:
The Milligan decision is justly celebrated for its rejection
of the government’s position that the Bill of Rights has no
application in wartime. It would have been a sounder
decision, and much more widely approved at the time, had
it not gone out of its way to declare that Congress had no
authority to do that which it never tried to do.27

Justice Rehnquist’s evaluation of Davis’s majority opinion in which he declared
Congress did not have the authority to establish military commissions is particularly
germane to this thesis. As we will see, Davis’s statement on Congressional power
triggered Radical understanding of Milligan as an attack on Congressional
Reconstruction. It is therefore understandable why Congress launched several attacks on
the Supreme Court soon thereafter, such as reducing its membership and restricting its
appellate jurisdiction.
The post-9/11 world provided another opportunity to shed new light on Milligan.
In a 2003 article for The Nation, Eric Foner commented on the threats to civil liberties
during wartime:
In the aftermath of the Civil War, a far greater crisis than
the war on Iraq, the Supreme Court in the Milligan case
invalidated the use of military tribunals to try civilians.
27

William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime (New York: Vintage,
1998): 137, quoted in Barry, “Ex parte Milligan,” 375.
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The Court proclaimed that the Constitution is not
suspended in wartime…Alas we have not always lived up
to this ideal. The history of civil liberties in the United
States is not always a straight-line trajectory toward ever
greater freedom. It is a complex story in which victories
can prove temporary and regression can follow progress.28

Foner gave a full-throated endorsement to the heroic liberal view of the Davis opinion
even while admitting that the decision had often been honored only in the breech.
Remarkably, our foremost historian of Reconstruction did little to contextualize the Davis
opinion in the field of his own expertise.
Constitutional scholars John Yoo and Curtis Bradley addressed Milligan in the
context of post-9/11 military detentions and tribunals. Yoo was a Deputy Assistant U.S.
Attorney General during the Bush Administration and the author of the “Torture Memo”
which greatly expanded executive authority in the context of enhanced interrogation
techniques. In 2008, Yoo declared that “Milligan was not just a vindication of
Merryman, but a dramatic expansion of it.”29 Milligan elicited a broader question: does
the suspension of habeas corpus allow for the military trial of civilians? Yoo’s analysis is
somewhat shortsighted. Merryman, in effect, established nothing because Lincoln
ignored it. Additionally, Davis did not strike down Lincoln’s executive suspension of
habeas corpus.

Yoo went on to criticize Milligan by defending the use of military

commissions and opposing the Supreme Court’s role in reviewing executive authority

28
Eric Foner, “Dare Call It Treason,” The Nation, June 2, 2003 quoted in Barry, “Ex parte
Milligan,” 376.
29
John Yoo, “Merryman and Milligan,” Journal of Supreme Court History 34 (November 2008),
519.
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during wartime. For Yoo, allowing the Court to review military commission proceedings
“ignores the costs of judicial intervention…to the war effort.”30
In 2009, Curtis Bradley concluded that “[p]erhaps the greatest significance of
Milligan is symbolic rather than doctrinal. [It] provides a precedential counterweight to
claims of unlimited government authority in wartime.”31 A national crisis, again,
advanced the question of military authority over civilians, leaving historical analysis on
the back-burner. Yoo and Bradley briefly examined the case’s historical relevance and
impact on Civil War era civil liberties, but left the question of Reconstruction and the
reasoning behind Justice Davis’ majority opinion, wholly unanswered.
Despite the attention lavished on ex parte Milligan, the literature on David Davis
nevertheless remains quite scarce. The earliest known biography is a 1930 unpublished
PhD dissertation by Harry E. Pratt from the University of Illinois. Pratt was the first to
use Davis’s personal papers in writing this first-ever biography of the judge. This
dissertation was simply a blow-by-blow account of Davis’s life with no discernable thesis
or argument. Likewise, its treatment of Milligan was simply matter-of-fact and adduced
that it was Davis’s “best work.”32 There is no mention of how Davis and his opinion
impacted civil liberties issues during the Civil War-era.
Not until 1960 did another biography of Davis appear in the historical literature.
Chicago attorney Willard King’s Lincoln’s Manager: David Davis was much more

Yoo, “Merryman and Milligan,” 533.
Bradley, “The Story of Ex parte Milligan,” 376.
32
Pratt, “David Davis,” 137.
30
31
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expansive than Pratt’s. It included then-recently discovered Davis family letters which
allowed him to develop a more detailed story of the judge’s life. However, much like
Pratt’s work, King’s biography was merely a narrative. “David Davis’s chief
contribution to American history was the part he played in the nomination of Abraham
Lincoln…Had Judge Davis not lived, Lincoln would not have been nominated.”33 In
other words, King did not bring to the forefront Davis’s role in civil liberties during the
Civil War. Rather he simply focused on a brief moment in a larger, more significant
career as a Supreme Court justice. King’s analysis of Milligan’s significance fell short as
well. He simply quoted Charles Warren in calling the opinion “one of the bulwarks of
American liberty” and claimed that “it stands in all the grandeur of its original
utterance.”34 By 1960, no historian had yet outlined the historical significance of David
Davis in the context of ex parte Milligan and the Civil War and Reconstruction.
In 2009, Connecticut attorney William D. Bader and former Chief Justice Frank J.
Williams of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, wrote a biography of Davis in the Roger
Williams University Law Review, entitled, “David Davis: Lawyer, Judge, and Politician
in the Age of Lincoln.” Once again, this work was long on narrative and short on
legal/historical argument. Bader and Williams’ view of Davis’s significance was,
“Besides his authorship of Ex Parte Milligan…He pioneered a movement toward
implementing an intermediate court of appeals in the federal court system…and his
actions as a United States Senator helped shape the structure of today’s federal
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judiciary.”35 It stands to reason that two members of the legal community would form
their study of Davis around his impact on the current day judicial system rather than his
impact on history. But their view of Milligan’s significance simply rested in its use as a
legal precedent and not in its significance for Civil War era history.
The judicial politics of Reconstruction are vital to understanding the environment
in which the case was understood by public opinion, specifically Radical Republicans.
The most recent scholarship on judicial politics during Reconstruction is Pamela
Brandwein’s Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction. Brandwein challenges
the popularly held notion that during Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, the Supreme
Court assisted in restoring white supremacy in the South by narrowly interpreting the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. She argues that scholars have
overlooked the ways in which the Waite court (1874-1888) allowed for the federal
protection of African Americans in the South, protections that successive Congresses and
presidencies failed to afford them. She notes that while members of the Waite court such
as Joseph Bradley and Samuel Miller ruled that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments did not guarantee equal access to public accommodations, they did not
intend to leave African Americans in the hands of southern white supremacy. Instead,
she shows how the Court drew a legal distinction between social, political, and civil
rights. The Court held that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments did not
provide for equal access to public spaces, but they did allow for federal protection in
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national elections if black voters were being subjected to intimidation, violence, or fraud.
Additionally, the Court maintained that the federal government could intervene locally if
states purposefully failed to protect African Americans’ due process rights or property
rights. It is true that the Fuller court (1888-1910) finally sanctioned Jim Crow, but they
had to first overturn these important Waite court decisions. 36
This thesis joins Brandwein in arguing that the blame for the failure of
Reconstruction should not be laid on the Supreme Court the way it has been. I, however,
push this interpretation of the Reconstruction courts back to David Davis’s 1866 majority
opinion in Milligan. While Davis struck down military commissions in the North, he left
executive authority intact in the South, where it could be used to protect freedmen from
all-white courts and juries. As we will see in chapter 5, in more than one case, Davis
sided with the majority to uphold military commissions in the South.
In sum, legal scholars have examined Milligan in order to understand the role of
presidential war power, the role of courts during wartime, and the classification of nontraditional combatants. Historians have done much the same, just within an historical
context and less from a legal standpoint. Still, the controlling unanswered questions that
lie at the heart of all this historiography, is what is the historical importance of David
Davis and Ex parte Milligan in the context of civil liberties issues during the Civil War
and Reconstruction; and what is the place of Milligan in the rise of Judicial Supremacy
based on the Bill of Rights? I intend to fill this scholarly void by examining how David
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Davis emerged as a civil libertarian during the American Civil War, how his
constitutional and anti-Partysim views helped shape Ex parte Milligan, and why Radical
Republicans misinterpreted this opinion as an attack on Congressional Reconstruction in
the South. This chapter in American history has not been told in large part because
Abraham Lincoln has overshadowed Davis. Yet, this thesis will rely heavily on
Lincoln’s correspondence with Davis in order to understand the man and the jurist and to
finally give him his long overdue recognition.
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CHAPTER II
DAVID DAVIS: JURIST AND CIVIL LIBERTARIAN

During a war replete with civil liberties issues, the military trial of Lamdin P.
Milligan and his co-conspirators in the fall of 1864 was a particularly prominent civil
liberties case. Many of these civil liberties issues were raised by Peace Democrats, also
known as Copperheads who strongly opposed the Northern war effort. Interestingly,
Judge David Davis intervened on behalf of many of these Copperheads who had been
arrested and tried before military commissions for voicing their discontent with the
Lincoln administration. A fundamental understanding of David Davis’s anti-Partyism and
his maturation as a civil libertarian during the Civil War is therefore necessary to fully
appreciate the legal landscape that brought Milligan to trial in the winter of 1864. Thus
we can begin to understand the political environment in which Davis decided the
Milligan case and how it was understandably misinterpreted by Radical Republicans.
David Davis was born on the slave-holding Rounds Plantation in Cecil County,
Maryland in 1815. He was nursed by a slave woman and grew up playing with the
African-American children on the plantation. At age five, when Davis’s grandfather
died, he inherited two slave boys who were sold the next year by his legal guardian. This
Southern environment produced in Davis a fervent hatred of Abolitionism.
21

Many, particularly in Eastern Maryland, hated abolitionists. 37 In 1820, Davis was sent to
live with his paternal uncle, Reverend Henry Lyon Davis, in Annapolis. The Reverend
was a staunch supporter of Henry Clay and instilled his pro-Clay, moderately anti-slavery
beliefs in his nephew at an early age. Through his uncle’s influence, Davis himself
became a follower of Clay and later a member of the Whig Party. 38 This political
affiliation fostered his adherence to the rule of law and a high view of judicial authority
which became one of the foundational blocks of his majority opinion in Milligan.
In 1832, Davis graduated from Kenyon College and then proceeded to study law
under Henry Bishop in Lennox, Massachusetts. During this time, he became close to his
future father-in-law, Judge William Perrin Walker. Judge Walker’s opposition to both
slavery and abolitionism reinforced Davis’s own views on human bondage as well as on
extremist politics. Davis went on to attend Yale Law School graduating in 1835, after
which he moved to Pekin, Illinois to begin the practice of law. One year later, he moved
his law practice to Bloomington after buying an office from local attorney Jesse Fell. It
was during this time in Bloomington that his passion for politics began to grow. As an
outspoken Whig, Davis campaigned for William Henry Harrison and protested the
annexation of Texas.39 In 1844, Davis was elected to the Illinois legislature where he
served as a leading Whig until 1847.40
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In the early 1830s, the Whig Party was formed in response to a perceived
usurpation of executive power by Andrew Jackson. From this position, they promoted
congressional authority over the executive, a high view of the courts and the constitution,
and a close adherence to the rule of law. Moreover, they believed in the elastic clause
and judicial construction.41 This Whiggish background may explain, in part, Davis’s
decision in Milligan. While both Lincoln and Davis came out of the Whig tradition,
Davis upheld the law at all costs. Lincoln, however, seemed to assume there could be no
law without order first. In defense of suspending habeas corpus during the Civil War,
Lincoln famously asked, were “all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”42 And in his speech on the
Dred Scott decision in 1857, Lincoln willingly acknowledged that even the Supreme
Court decisions were rooted in public opinion, opinion that could be shaped.43 Thus
Lincoln viewed constitutional law in more plastic, political, and republican terms.
In April 1844, when the Democratic Convention convened, Martin Van Buren
was passed over for James Polk as the nominee. The Whig nominee, Henry Clay, made a
politically fatal mistake by opposing the annexation of Texas. In response, the Liberty
Party, backed by the political abolitionists, took enough Whig votes from Clay to defeat
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him, resulting in Polk’s election, or at least this was how Lincoln and Davis saw it. After
seeing his political hero defeated and never having another chance at winning the
presidency due to his age, Davis remarked to his father-in-law, “The abolitionists are
hereafter and forevermore shut out of the pale of my sympathy.”44 While Lincoln later
worked closely with Owen Lovejoy and Charles Sumner on emancipation, this lack of
sympathy for abolitionists and their extremist politics on Davis’s part would continue
well into the Civil War and thus have a significant impact on Davis’s opposition to
Radical Republicans.45
Likewise, Davis equally despised extremist Democrats known as Locofocos. In
1840, anti-Tammany Democrats were given this name by Whigs when an incident in
which leaders of the Democratic Tammany Society in New York attempted to disrupt a
meeting of the Young Mechanics in the Society by turning off the gas lights. In response,
the men held their meeting by the light of matches called “locofocos.” Locofocos
supported Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren and advocated free trade, greater
circulation of specie, and opposed state banks, all of which flew in the face of Whiggish
ideology.46 In a letter to Julius Rockwell, Davis said, “if some of our Lenox
[Masschusetts] friends were to witness the genuine effects of Loco focoism in Illinois,
they would not plume themselves greatly upon their adherence to the fortunes of Mr. Van
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Buren.”47 Davis again wrote Rockwell the following year complaining about the decline
of the Whig party in Illinois. “The printing of P[ost] O[ffice] D[epartment] is given to the
vilest Loco Foco print in the State. Mr. [Daniel] Webster has taken the printing from all
the Whig papers in the West & bestowed it upon the filthiest of the papers opposed to
us.”48 Davis also placed blame upon the radical Democrats for the Mexican War. “This
Mexican War must certainly open the eyes of the American people to the iniquities of
Loco Focoism. This Mexican War is playing hob with all business men. Don’t you think
the Loco Foco party will ruin the Country?”49 It is unclear as to whether Davis thought
that Loco focos were directly responsible for the bank and free trade issues thought to
have been caused by the war, or simply that the army was taking business men as
recruits. Either way, it is clear that he despised the extremist wing of the Democratic
Party.
In the spring of 1847, Davis was elected to the Constitutional Convention which
met that June. The president of the convention assigned Davis only to the committee on
Law Reform. In this capacity, he helped set up separate supreme and circuit court judges
to be elected by the people instead of by the legislature. This was an attempt to insulate
judges from direct political manipulation. It came on the heels of a court packing scheme
whereby the Democrats in the General Assembly increased the size of the court and put
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Stephen A. Douglas on it in order to reverse a court ruling.50 So in the context of this
thesis, fixing the size of the Court by constitution rather than by simple law might have
been a move in the direction of something akin to what we later came to call judicial
supremacy.
As in the Illinois General Assembly, the question of African American
immigration into the state was the product of much heated debate at the Constitutional
Convention. Davis actively fought the prohibition of black immigration as it would
offend the northern portion of Illinois. Here we can see early signs of Davis’s views on
civil liberties and the constitution; perhaps views that would later influence his opinion in
Milligan. Even though Davis held prejudicial views himself and in fact personally
opposed black immigration into Illinois, he placed his own views aside. In his mind, he
had been sent to the constitutional convention to remedy certain problems in the state
government and was not willing to endanger the constitution’s adoption by this or any
other provision.51 He would take the same non-partisan stance in Milligan by defending
the civil liberties of extremist Democrats and at the same time maintaining Radicalbacked military commissions in the South.
After leaving the legislature, Davis was nominated as a Whig candidate for judge
in the newly organized Illinois Eighth Judicial Circuit and was elected without opposition
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in September of 1848. He served in this position until his appointment to the United
States Supreme Court in 1862. As slavery became an increasingly volatile issue in the
1850s and as some Whigs began to abolitionize, Judge Davis feared for his party’s future.
In a letter to his cousin, Julius Rockwell, Davis wrote his assessment of the KansasNebraska Bill. “Sumner talks unnecessarily saucy. The Southern Senators are not so
much to blame as these scoundrels at the North. I regret the movement on this question
of slavery, being really afraid that a sectional issue will be made disastrous to this
country. Try to save the Whig party. I don’t fancy its being abolitionized.”52 Like many
northern Whigs during this schism in the wake of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854,
Davis immediately joined the Republican Party; as opposed to other Whigs who went to
the Know-Nothing Party and then to the Republican Party (Mary Lincoln) or those who
went to the Know-Nothing Party and then to the Democrats (John Todd Stuart).53 Like
Lincoln, Davis took the more direct route from Whig to Republican. In a letter to his
brother-in-law, Julius Rockwell, Davis wrote, “Every additional trip to Maryland
confirms me in my desire to live in a free State.”54 As a conservative Republican, Davis
vehemently opposed slavery and continued to see Abolitionists as “insincere demagogues
striving for public office at the expense of the public weal.”55 Lincoln was extremely
cagey in 1854-1856, but once the Whig Party was really most sincerely dead, he was
willing to work with abolitionists. We do not see Davis as a civil libertarian at this point
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in his life though. He was more concerned with the people’s welfare than with individual
liberty.
This would change during the Civil War as concerns for individual civil liberties
(for white men) impeded more heavily on his mind. In her 2008 dissertation entitled, “A
Dilemma of Civil Liberties: Blacks under Union Military Control, 1861-1866, Karin
Petlack argued that “when the Union Army suppressed white Americans’ freedom of
speech and threatened punishment for any sort of violent behavior during the war…the
black community was able to establish black newspapers, expand their religious
institutions, and increase educational offerings with little fear of assault.”56 In other
words, Petlack suggested that Black civil liberties could only be enforced by restricting
White civil liberties. If they were not so enforced, white people would have infringed
upon Black civil liberties. Lincoln was willing to side with Black rights of course, but
Davis was not, yet he remained fervently antislavery.
Why then, did Davis oppose “political” abolitionists if he was in fact antislavery
himself? Many Whigs, like Davis, were against “political” abolitionists not because of
their goal to rid the country of slavery but rather because of their advocacy of violence to
do so. This was a time in American history in which society on the prairie was changing
and lawyers were the individuals making this change. Lawyers and judges were seeking
social order. Therefore, Davis, as a man of the law, saw “political” abolitionist violence
to be detrimental to law and social order that he and other jurists were attempting to
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establish. Nor did Davis agree with abolitionist ideology in regards to black political
rights. In a letter to Lincoln during the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Davis stated, “It is
industriously circulated that you favor negro Equality. All the orators should
distinctively & emphatically disavow negro suffrage, negroes holding office, serving on
juries & the like.”57 Lincoln famously took Davis’s advice at the Charleston debate and
in a rather convoluted way, distanced himself from Black equality, a position that,
according to James Oakes lasted only until the First Inaugural, where Lincoln came out
for extending equal privileges and immunities to Blacks.58 Davis, on the other hand, held
these prejudicial views for the rest of his life. Still, when it came to ruling from the
bench, Davis kept his views out of the decision-making process. Even during his time as
a Circuit Court Judge, Davis dismissed a case in 1854 for an African American woman
who had been arrested for disturbing the peace. She was released on her own
recognizance.59
In this context, we can then establish a political pedigree in which Davis’s
opposition to Radical Republicans stemmed more from his resistance to abolitionism,
rather than simply anti-Partyism. This will become vital to understand later on when
Radicals in Congress react to Milligan. In their minds, Davis’s opinion jeopardized their
ability to use military commissions to protect freedmen in a post-war South. Yet, as we
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have seen, he equally opposed extremist Democrats. In 1863, Davis shared with his
brother-in-law Julius Rockwell his disdain for Peace Democrats, just as he had opposed
Locofocos in his early political career. “The Democratic party in this State [Illinois] is in
the hands of Extreme men just as the …Republican party of the U.S. is in the hands of the
extreme Anti-Slavery men.”60 Only a month before, Davis had written to his wife Sarah,
complaining of Peace Democrats, or Copperheads, publicly denouncing Lincoln as a
“tyrant & despot” and “charging him with violating the Constitution and being a worse
traitor than Jeff Davis.”61 Ironically, Milligan could be seen today as a Copperhead
document in its chastisement of Lincoln and his extra-constitutional actions during the
war.
The circumstances that resulted in the elevation of Davis to the Supreme Court
had little to do with civil liberties but it is worth noting exactly how he did reach the
highest court in the land. When Lincoln took office in 1861, he was faced with filling
three vacancies on the Supreme Court. He was also faced with an impending national
crisis. He chose to deal with the latter first. It was not until January 1862 that he turned
his attention to the Court. Presidential appointments to the Supreme Court worked
differently in the 19th century, however. At the time, President Lincoln was restricted by
law requiring every associate justice to represent one of the nine judicial circuits. Thus,
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he had to fill the three vacancies with judges from the seventh, eighth, and ninth judicial
circuits.62
Even though Lincoln and Davis were very close friends and many thought
Davis’s nomination was a fait accompli, Lincoln hesitated in nominating him. Davis,
himself, actually hoped that Lincoln would appoint him as a federal district court judge
rather than a Supreme Court justice. Illinois Senator Orville Browning was in the
running for the Supreme Court and very much appealed to the president. However, after
being inundated with letters from friends and colleagues of both Lincoln and Davis,
Lincoln finally made the decision to nominate Davis. The president made the offer to
Davis in the summer of 1862 while Congress was out of session.63
Davis’s feelings on his own recess appointment were not very optimistic. He
doubted whether he could perform competently on the Supreme Court. This is
understandable given the fact that all of his experience had been at the trial court level
and largely dealt with the common law, rather than constitutional issues. He expressed
his misgivings to a friend in January 1862. “I often doubt whether I could sustain myself
on the Supreme Bench. It may be that I am not self-confident enough. I certainly could
not without hard study. I have but little legal learning, and whether study would suit me
now may be very doubtful.”64 It can be fairly stated that Judge Davis had no particular
judicial agenda when he assumed the Supreme Court. Yet, it was during his time as a
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justice that he would emerge as a civil libertarian, drafting what many see as one of the
greatest defenses of civil liberties in American jurisprudence.
Despite his own doubts about his judicial potential, Davis was confirmed by the
Senate on December 8, 1862 and took the bench two days later.65 Early on in his tenure
as associate justice, he expressed his continued disdain for partisan politics. “The labors
of the Court are considerable, but I feel just now, as if I could get along with them,
provided, I could keep out of politics & visitors would let me alone.”66
Davis, though, intervened in cases involving civil liberties long before he ruled in
Milligan. It is in this sub-plot that Davis emerged as a civil libertarian. Concerns about
civil liberties issues had been raised very early in Lincoln’s presidency beginning with
the 1861 suspension of habeas corpus that resulted in Ex parte Merryman. In the days
and months following Fort Sumter, Lincoln faced unprecedented events that required
extraordinary actions. At that point, seven southern states had already seceded from the
Union. On April 19, a mob in Baltimore obstructed Massachusetts troops from marching
through the city, on their way to Washington. When word came that a special session of
the Maryland legislature had been called, Republicans feared that a secession ordinance
would be adopted. Lincoln held off on arresting the members of the Maryland legislature
at first, but on April 27, he gave General Winfield Scott the following order:
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the
laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the
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vicinity of the military line, which is now used between the
City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington, via
Perryville, Annapolis City, and Annapolis Junction, you
find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the
Writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you,
personally or through the officer in command at the point
where the resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that
writ.”67

Nine members of the Maryland legislature were arrested before they could even have the
opportunity to vote for or against secession. In The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln
and Civil Liberties, historian Mark Neely argues that Lincoln’s suspension of habeas
corpus was not originally a political measure, nor would it become a political measure
over the course of the war. For Neely, Lincoln was simply responding to military threats:
the blockage of military troop routes and a Democratic-controlled state legislature.
Although Neely exonerated Lincoln of politically motivated wrong-doing, rogue
military officers were also responsible for complicating civil liberties issues during the
war. On August 30, 1861, Major General John C. Frémont issued a proclamation stating
that circumstances in Missouri required a state of martial law. According to the
proclamation, all persons within the prescribed military district found with weapons
would be tried by court-martial. Fearing that the border state of Missouri would secede,
Lincoln immediately ordered Frémont to rescind the proclamation.68 Military
commissions were convened throughout Missouri in order to hear cases involving the
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destruction of railroads, railroad cars, and telegraph lines. On January 1, 1862, Major
General Henry W. Halleck, acting on his own authority, stated that the civilian courts in
Missouri, “can give us no assistance as they are very generally unreliable. There is no
alternative but to enforce martial law.”69 To counteract many of these unauthorized
military commissions, Lincoln reviewed the case proceedings and overturned them.
However, these reviews were few and far between. He was much too preoccupied with
the war in Virginia and thus in the words of Mark Neely, he “failed to act with sufficient
decisiveness to meet Missouri’s extraordinary problems, and civil liberties in that state
were severely restricted by local military commanders for months before the president
did anything.”70
When Lincoln first suspended habeas corpus, it was geographically limited.
Later, on September 24, 1862, he suspended the writ nationwide, mainly in response to
draft dodgers. This second suspension encompassed “any person or persons who may be
engaged, by act, speech, or writing, in discouraging volunteer enlistments, or in any way
giving aid and comfort to the enemy, or in any other disloyal practice against the United
States” and “that such persons may be tried before a military commission.”71 Legal
scholar Dan Farber noted, “Lincoln’s use of habeas in areas of insurrection or actual war
should be considered constitutionally appropriate, at least in the absence of any contrary
action by Congress. But even after Congress authorized suspending habeas corpus, as we
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will see, the use of military law in the North sometimes went beyond constitutional
limits.”72
For nearly two years, Congress remained on the sidelines but on March 3, 1863,
Congress took Lincoln’s side and passed the Habeas Corpus Act. In order to resolve
jurisdictional problems like those posed in Merryman and later Milligan, Congress
established that “during the present rebellion, the President of the United States,
whenever in his judgement the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States or any part
thereof.”73 However, Congress did take care to provide some relief to those arrested
under the suspension. The act provided that the Secretary of War was required to present
a list of all prisoners to the civil courts. If a grand jury met without indicting said
prisoners, those prisoners were to be immediately released from custody on the condition
of taking a loyalty oath.74 Lincoln resisted using the act, believing that he did not need it.
In May of 1863, when a group of New York Democrats criticized him for violating civil
liberties, Lincoln via the Corning Letter, did not even reference the act to justify his
actions.75 Yet, in September, when he suspended the writ again, Lincoln’s order began by
referring to both the Constitution and the act and ends by urging all citizens "to conduct
and govern themselves ... in accordance with the Constitution of the United States and the
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laws of Congress.”76 Here it appears that he was prepared to assert Constitutional and
Congressional authority to suspend the writ.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, though, did not explicitly prohibit military
commissions. Commissions would therefore continue to be the primary judicial
instrument for the duration of the war and largely remain unregulated by either the
legislative or sometimes even the executive branch. Lincoln’s task as President during
the war was so vast that he was forced to delegate power to state and local officials. The
governor of Indiana and the military commanders appointed there by the War Department
were given broad authority to quell Copperhead dissent, which in turn led to the military
trial of Milligan and his co-defendants.
It appears Davis first began to show concerns about the direction of the Lincoln
administration was taking on Northern civil liberties issues in the winter of 1862. In
November 1862, Davis brought with him a letter from Judge Samuel Treat of St. Louis,
who had issued a writ of habeas corpus for a civilian which the military had refused to
acknowledge. Like Davis, Treat was a close personal friend of Lincoln’s and his chess
partner in Springfield.77 Lincoln had pled over 1,200 cases before Judge Treat at both the
trial and appeals level. In his letter to Davis, Judge Treat advised Lincoln to act within
the Constitution so as to increase support in the Border State of Missouri. He also
suggested that the President send the entire western army to secure the Mississippi.78 In
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response, Lincoln wrote Treat stating that “the country will not allow us to send our
whole Western force down the Mississippi, while the enemy sacks Louisville and
Cincinnati.”79 While Lincoln did not even mention the habeas corpus issue in his
response to Treat, the fact that Davis presented Treat’s letter to him strongly suggests he
was concerned about civil liberties five weeks before he took his seat on the Supreme
Court.
Thus was the Northern civil liberties landscape that Davis faced during the first
two years of the war. It is also important to note that he supported Lincoln’s war-time
actions in the South. In the Prize Cases, Davis along with Grier, Wayne, Swayne, and
Miller upheld Lincoln’s naval blockade of the South.80 This case confirmed the
legitimacy of treating the Confederacy as a belligerent under the laws of war which in
turn justified the sweeping use of the commander-in-chief clause, among other things, to
confiscate Confederate property, including the emancipation of slaves, and to use military
commissions.
Davis did, however, take exception to one Southern war measure: the
Emancipation Proclamation. This makes sense in light of Davis’s own racial prejudices.
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On one occasion, he told Lincoln that issuing the proclamation would be counterproductive to the war. Nothing is said about a meeting with Lincoln in the Davis papers
on this issue, but according to Orville H. Browning, a friend of both Davis and Lincoln,
“Judge Davis…told me that he had a conversation with the President yesterday and urged
upon him to change his policy, as the only means of saving the Country.” In response,
Lincoln stated, “his proclamation in regards to slavery was a fixed thing.”81 Six months
later, in a letter to his brother-in-law Julius Rockwell, Davis blamed Lincoln’s
proclamation for the Border States’ discontent with the war. “In the Western Country
until the Emancipation Proclamation, the people were united in the support of the WarNow, they are divided.”82 Other than this particular issue, Davis consistently upheld
Lincoln’s war-time actions when it came to the southern states in rebellion. His actions
in the North, however, concerned Davis greatly.
Soon thereafter, in the spring of 1863, Davis intervened with Lincoln again in a
civil liberties issue. In March of that year, Wilber F. Storey, editor of the Chicago Times,
began publishing editorials vehemently criticizing the Lincoln administration and
encouraging Northerners to protest its war policies, especially the Emancipation
Proclamation. The Times frequently ran supposed letters from soldiers, voicing their
opposition to abolitionism. Storey brought to the newspaper a seething hatred for blacks
and abolitionists that he extended to the Republican Party and the Lincoln administration
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as well. On March 17, Storey called for “a united, bold, vigorous, unyielding opposition
to the prosecution of the war.”83 In response, General Ambrose Burnside, Commander of
the Department of Ohio, finally ordered the Times shut down on June 1. Public outrage
was immediately felt in response to Burnside’s action. Several politicians pleaded with
Lincoln to rescind Burnside’s order. David Davis and William Herndon, Lincoln’s old
law partner from Springfield, sent Lincoln a telegram stating, “We deem it of the highest
importance that you revoke the order ... suppressing the Chicago Times.”84
In “To Suppress or Not to Suppress: Abraham Lincoln and the Chicago Times,”
Craig D. Tenney suggests that it was Davis and Herndon’s telegram that convinced
Lincoln to rescind Burnside’s order. “It would appear from…the Davis-Herndon
telegram that Lincoln…had already felt what to him would be rather weighty political
pressure to negate Burnside’s action against the Times.”85 On June 4, Lincoln wrote to
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton ordering him to rescind the suppression of Storey’s
newspaper. “I have received additional dispatches which with former ones [the DavisHerndon message] induce me to believe we should revoke or suspend the order
suspending the Chicago Times, and if you concur in [this] opinion, please have it
done.”86 No correspondence exists that emphatically states that it was Davis and
Herndon’s letter that finally convinced Lincoln but Davis continued to voice his concerns
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about civil liberties issues as the war progressed. During this time and in the context of
the Civil War, Davis evolved into a civil libertarian.
Storey’s situation also closely relates to the issues in Milligan. As we will see,
Lambdin P. Milligan was convicted not on evidence relating to a conspiracy to overthrow
the government, but rather on one single published speech in which he criticized the
Northern war effort. No doubt, this intervention by Davis reflected his growing concern
with government actions he felt to be constitutionally questionable. In addition to
shutting down newspapers, silencing speech, and suspending habeas corpus, Davis also
began to intervene on behalf of Copperheads who faced trial by military commissions.
In May 1863, while sitting as circuit judge in Indianapolis, Davis wrote to a
Grand Jury:
Gentlemen of the Grand Jury: We meet in a time of great
national peril-in the midst of a war, unexampled for its
wickedness and magnitude. Our own honor-the treasure
that has been spent-the blood that has been shed-the
memories of the past, and the hopes of the future demand
that this rebellion shall be crushed, the union of these States
restored, and the authority of law recognized. We may, and
will differ, in any great war, on the right manner of
conducting it, and the wisdom of the policy pursued, but no
man, who is not a traitor at heart, will ever suffer that
difference to lead him by speech or writing of counsel
resistance to law. It is charged that there are secret
organizations with ‘grips, signs, and passwords’ having for
their objects-resistance to Law, and the overthrow of the
Government. If anywhere in this State bad men have
combined together for such wicked purposes, I pray you,
bring them to light and let them receive the punishment due
to their crime.87
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The jury asked for a copy of the judge’s charge so they could publish it in the
Indianapolis Journal. Here, Davis again supported the war and punishing those who
obstructed its progress, but at the same time insisted that the law be respected. Once
more, this illustrates Davis’s later intention of only applying Milligan’s holding to
military commissions in the North.
At the same time Davis was holding court in Indianapolis, Clement L.
Vallandigham was being tried by a military commission in Ohio for making a speech
against the war effort. When his case reached the Supreme Court, Vallandigham’s
petition was denied. The Court reasoned that:
The appellate powers of the Supreme Court, as granted by
the Constitution, are limited and regulated by the acts of
Congress, and must be exercised subject to the exceptions
and regulations made by Congress. In other words, the
petition before us we think not to be within the letter or
spirit of the grants of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court. It is not in law or equity within the meaning of those
terms as used in the 3d article of the Constitution. Nor is a
military commission a court within the meaning of the 14th
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. [Power of the
Supreme Court to grant writs of habeas corpus] Nor can it
be said that the authority to be exercised by a military
commission is judicial in that sense. It involves discretion
to examine, to decide and sentence, but there is no original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to issue a writ of habeas
corpus to review or reverse its proceedings, or the writ of
certiorari to revise the proceedings of a military
commission.88
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It is important to note that while the Court did not accept Vallandigham’s case based on a
technical jurisdiction matter, they rejected the ideas that military commissions were
judicial bodies. According to Davis’s biographer, Willard King, Justice Davis later stated
in private that Vallandigham’s trial by military commission had been wrong.89 However,
King’s citation for this alleged comment by Davis came from William Herndon and Jesse
Weik’s Herndon’s Lincoln. In cross checking this citation, Herndon’s book does not
make mention of Davis stating that he thought Vallandigham’s military commission was
wrong. It appears that King miscited Herndon or perhaps misread him. Additionally, no
other primary source indicates that Davis ever made such a statement, but one could
adduce from his concern over civil liberties especially military commissions, that he
could have done so.
Violent riots in the North began to grow in resistance to the Enrollment Act of
1863. In March, Brigadier General Henry B. Carrington was appointed to the District of
Indiana and worked closely with Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton to organize and train
troops to suppress uprisings. He also developed a very intricate espionage network that
kept Morton and Lincoln informed of Copperhead activity in Indiana. This close
working relationship became tenuous however when General Ambrose E. Burnside was
put in command of the Department of Ohio, of which Indiana was a part. On April 13,
1863, Burnside issued General Orders No. 38, prescribing strict military punishment for
any person who opposed the federal government and sympathized with the Confederacy.
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Morton was infuriated over Burnside’s action. He was afraid that this extreme order
would just fuel more resistance to the government. Yet, Morton remained publically
silent, that is until his right-hand man General Carrington was fired by Burnside. General
Milo S. Hascall, Carrington’s replacement, immediately began to arrest Democratic
newspaper editors and destroy their presses. Morton went from infuriated to seething.
Hascall’s actions did not eliminate Peace Democratic (Copperhead) opposition however;
it only strengthened the anti-war sentiment in Indiana.90
In response, Morton embarked on a crusade to have both Burnside and Hascall
removed from command. In doing so, he turned to Justice David Davis for help. Davis
personally telegraphed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, stating, “I have been for several
weeks, and am, perfectly satisfied that the immediate removal of General Hascall is
demanded by the honor and interests of the Government.”91 Over the next month,
Morton made several trips to Washington City to press Lincoln to remove Burnside and
Hascall. Burnside remained in command but Stanton finally relieved Hascall in June. It
would be inaccurate to view Morton as a defender of Indiana’s freedom of the press and
speech however. As we will see in the case of Lamdin P. Milligan, Governor Morton
would go on to arrest Copperhead editors and speakers himself.92
Davis was of course not the only one who was becoming concerned about civil
liberties issues. It is therefore important to briefly delve into the range of opinions on
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civil liberties during the war. Democrats, especially Copperheads, obviously made these
concerns one of their primary causes. An 1864 Indiana case involving selling liquor to
soldiers, prefigured David Davis’ decision in Ex parte Milligan. On June 8, 1863, the
chief provost marshal of the military District of Indiana ordered Indianapolis provost
marshal Captain Frank Wilcox to prohibit the sale of liquor to enlisted soldiers. Joseph
Griffin was subsequently arrested for violating the order. He sued Wilcox for false
imprisonment. After losing his case in the Marion County Common Pleas Court, Griffin
appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court. Peace Democrat Judge Samuel E. Perkins
delivered a scathing opinion on military arrests of civilians.
Perkins’ concern was not whether Lincoln could arrest and hold civilians
indefinitely by suspending habeas corpus, but rather applying military law to civilians.
He noted that the suspension of habeas corpus did not legalize a wrongful arrest; it
simply prohibited the prisoner his right to challenge his detention. While he did not
address whether Congress could enact martial law, Perkins did define the conditions for
martial law. “Martial law is exercised in our country, the military being on the spot to
execute it, where no civil authority exists. But where the civil authority exists, the
Constitution is imperative that it shall be paramount to the military.”93 Perkins’ opinion
would slightly mirror Davis’s opinion two years later in Ex parte Milligan. We cannot
know for certain but it may be that Davis adopted Perkins’ opinion when he drafted
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Milligan, for they both recognized the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution in times of war
and peace and that martial law can only be implemented in areas of actual hostilities.
It is also important to note that Justice Perkins was fundamentally at odds with
Republicans about civil liberties. We already know Lincoln’s position: the constitution
provided him with vast war powers, especially in the face of rebellion. In his famous
“Corning letter” Lincoln explains, “Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who
deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wiley agitator who induces him to desert? I
think that in such a case, to silence the agitator, and save the boy, is not only
constitutional, but, with all, a great mercy.”94 Lincoln felt that Copperheads posed a real
threat in the form of diminishing the ranks. Rather than diminish the ranks himself by
executing deserters, Lincoln felt it necessary to eliminate the source of desertion. Davis
understood the threat of Peace Democrats as well, but he, unlike Lincoln, never believed
that civil liberties in the North should be sacrificed in the interest of prosecuting the war
in the South. While it is mere speculation, given Davis’s logic, he might have supported
shooting the simple-minded soldier boy rather than arrest the wiley agitator and risk
violating his constitutional right to a civilian trial.
Harvard Law professor and War Democrat Joel Parker, on the other hand, came to
the defense of Lincoln’s actions regarding civil liberties. He argued that habeas corpus
was not the same in war and peace. Even though civilian control of the military was
defined in the constitution, it could not be applied to camps or battlefields. Civil law
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simply could not be used in these places. Therefore, martial law naturally existed during
wartime by virtue of the laws of war. For Parker, it all came down to a matter of
practicality. He pointed out the harmful and dangerous result of allowing the halt of the
military but civil courts.95 Henry Stanbery, attorney for the government in Milligan,
would make a similar argument in defense of that particular military commission.
Likewise, Republican attorney and Congressman from Pennsylvania, Horace
Binney, offered a defense of Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus. In his 1862
pamphlet, The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the Constitution, Binney
avoided using circumstantial arguments based on the desperate times of the Civil War.
Nor did he plea morality or politics in supporting Lincoln’s actions. He stated:
The power to suspend the privilege of the Writ, is moreover
inseparably connected with rebellion or invasion, — with
internal war. The direction of such a war is necessarily
Avith the Executive. The office cannot be deprived of it. It
is the duty of the office, in both its military and civil
aspects, to suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion. The
power to suspend the privilege, is supplementary to the
military power to suppress or repel.96

For Binney then, the crux of when to suspend the writ lay with conditions-invasion or
rebellion. He argued that those were not same conditions as “war”, which Congress
possessed sole authority to declare. Instead, invasion and rebellion were factual
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conditions to be identified and dealt with immediately, whether Congress was in session
or not. Logically then, the power to suspend habeas corpus fell to the president.
For his part, Justice Davis made clear to Lincoln his position on military
commissions, as they became an emerging civil liberties issue. Writing to William
Herndon, Lincoln’s former law partner, in September 1866, Davis reflected:
Mr. Lincoln was advised and I so advised him, that the various
military trials in the Northern and Border States, where the
Courts were free and untrammeled, were unconstitutional and
wrong; that they should not and ought not to be sustained by the
Supreme Court; that such proceedings were dangerous to
liberty.97

Notice that Davis narrowed his opposition to military commission to the North and
Border States. He said nothing about military commissions in the South.
Not only did Davis advise the President against the use of military commissions
in the North and Border States, he also directly intervened on behalf of civilian
defendants who were put on trial before military commissions. On March 28, 1864, in
Charleston, Illinois, mounting hostility between Coles County Peace Democrats and
Union soldiers on leave finally came to a head. These soldiers had long resented Peace
Democrats for criticizing a war in which they themselves had fought and sacrificed so
much for. Encouraging draft dodging, too, infuriated Union soldiers. This animosity
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boiled over into a riot in late March which left six soldiers and three civilians killed and
twelve wounded. To be sure, it was one of the bloodiest riots in the North. Over the next
several days, fifty citizens were arrested and about one hundred depositions were taken
from other Coles County residents. In the end, sixteen prisoners were incarcerated at
Camp Yates in Springfield. One prisoner died while in custody.98
In June, a Coles County grand jury returned fourteen indictments against
Copperheads for murder and riot. However, only two were indicted for murder and two
were indicted for rioting. The other prisoners had escaped and fled the area. The legal
prosecution, however, followed two paths. The military, based on a recommendation
from Judge Advocate General Henry Burnett, a military commission was appointed to try
the prisoners in Cincinnati, Ohio, on June 21, 1864. Meanwhile, Attorneys Orlando B.
Ficklin and Milton Hay were working feverously to get the unindicted prisoners released
and the indicted prisoners handed over to civil authorities. On June 22, Ficklin and Hay
requested a writ of habeas corpus from the Fourth Circuit Court, where Judge Samuel H.
Treat was presiding alongside David Davis who was on the circuit.99
Treat and Davis granted the writ which was then given to Colonel James Oakes,
commandant of Camp Yates, with instructions to release the prisoners and deliver them
to Springfield. However, Oakes had just been ordered by his superiors to deliver the men
to Cincinnati for military trial. The next day Oakes was informed by his commanding
officer that President Lincoln had suspended habeas corpus in the Coles County
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prisoner’s case. Judge Davis was in St. Louis when this transpired, but Judge Treat,
honoring the President’s suspension, dismissed the case. When Davis learned about the
suspension, he expressed his displeasure in a letter to Lincoln on July 1, 1864, stating:
The govt (sic) I think must have acted on the wrong
information. If I could get the necessary correct
information concerning the matter either for bringing it to
the President myself or do it in confirmation with Judge
Treat, as might be deemed most advisable.100
At this point in the exchange of correspondence, Davis did not provide an explanation as
to what he meant by “wrong information” but this incident again illustrates his increasing
concern for Lincoln’s actions regarding civil liberties.
Not knowing that Davis had sent this letter, Lincoln wrote Treat the following day
requesting that he and Davis send him their analysis of the case. In response, Judge Treat
sent Lincoln a telegram on July 4 stating:
The record in the case of the Coles Co prisoners was
ordered to be certified to the president it contains the whole
case in my opinion the prisoners should have
been surrendered to the civil authority under the act of
March Third (3) eighteen sixty three (1863) Judge Davis
was of the same opinion.101
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On the same day, Davis wrote a four-page letter to Lincoln summarizing the
evidence and providing his reasoning and statutory law for the release of the prisoners.
Davis adamantly stated:
The Govt. (sic) ought not to have taken these men out of
the hand of the law. Besides the disregard of the law as I
think, it will irritate the public mind and cannot possibly do
any good. A Grand Jury of Coles Co. has patiently
investigated the outrage at Charleston and found several
indictments for murder and riot.102

Here, it seems that Davis was trying to convince Lincoln that the local civilian court had
competently performed its duty by issuing the indictments. Therefore, a military trial
was not necessary. David continued with his reasoning by stating:
The guilty should be punished. Both certainty and severity
of punishment are demanded, where it can be measured out
if I understand the case a right only in a state court. These
prisoners violated no law of the United States. There was
no attempt to arrest a deserter. The fight was brought on
purposely by bad men who were not in the military service.
How can they be tried by military law? They violated no
military law.103

Davis did not question whether the prisoners should have been punished. His only
concern was that they were tried in the proper civilian court system, as they were
civilians themselves and not under the authority of the military. Davis concluded his
opinion to Lincoln by referencing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863:
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But even if they had violated a law of the United States, it
was the duty of the govt. after they were arrested to have
had them prosecuted at the first term of the court. Court
adjourned and no proceeding was had against them & as far
as the United States were concerned, they were entitled to
their discharge. The Secretary of War furnished no list of
the prisoners to the judges which should have been done,
and the Grand Jury adjourned.104

It is interesting to note that Davis did not appeal to the prisoner’s civil liberties via the
Bill of Rights. This particular intervention is solely based upon constitutional and
statutory law. Milligan though, would be the turning point for constitutional liberalism
and the supremacy of the Bill of Rights over military law and the laws of nations. Davis
was successful in his intervention for the Coles Co. Peace Democrats. Finally, on
November 4, 1864, Lincoln ordered the release of the prisoners.
Even though Davis was concerned about the mass uprising of Peace Democrats,
he was not willing to sacrifice their civil liberties in the interest of stamping out dissent.
This attention to the rule of law would be carried on into his majority opinion in Milligan.
A law and order Whig early in life, Davis became concerned with civil liberties issues,
specifically military commissions, over the course of the American Civil War. It is clear
that Davis strongly criticized Lincoln’s actions despite their close friendship. He would
also take Lincoln to task after he was assassinated in Milligan. Davis was not afraid to
express his concerns and objections to civil liberties issues in the North from a nonpartisan, constitutional standpoint. While he strongly opposed extremist political groups,
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like the Copperheads, he nevertheless stood up for their civil liberties. After directly
intervening in free speech, habeas corpus, and military commission cases while on the
Supreme Court, Davis would soon have another opportunity to place his imprimatur for
the defense of civil law over military law. Alongside eight other justices, in the winter of
1865, he would hear arguments in Ex parte Milligan that sowed the seeds for not only
one of the greatest defenses of American civil liberties, but also the worsening of
Reconstruction partisan politics. But first, we must look back to how Lamdin P.
Milligan’s case came to the attention of Judge David Davis to begin with.
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CHAPTER III
GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION: THE INDIANAPOLIS TREASON TRIAL
AND EX PARTE MILLIGAN

It should be noted from the outset that no testimony or direct evidence was
introduced that linked Milligan to the plot in Chicago or that he was at any meeting in
which the plot was discussed. Witnesses simply stated that he had been to several
organizational meetings with the other defendants and had accepted the rank of MajorGeneral as a member of the Sons of Liberty.105 Testimony did suggest that this
organization was, in fact, a clandestine, para-military arm of the Democratic Party. One
witness stated that the purpose of the Sons of Liberty was to uphold Democratic
principles and strengthen the party, while another stated that members were required to
be Democrats. In in his majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan David Davis would later
object to several elements of the Military Commission. Understanding these aspects of
the military trial will allow us to better understand why Davis ruled the way he did and
why the Radical Republicans viewed his decision adversely.
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Born on March 24, 1812 in Belmont, Ohio, Lamdin Purdy Milligan came of age
during the nullification crisis of 1832-1833.106 This would have a significant impact on
his political leanings. In February 1834, at age twenty-one, Milligan served as secretary
for the “Original Jacksonians” in St. Clairsville, Ohio. The group subscribed themselves
to the “Jeffersonian school of ’98 and ’99 (the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of
1798 and 1799-two documents upholding states’ rights). Early on, Milligan fully
supported Jackson’s defense of states’ rights but then took a less supportive attitude
towards him after Jackson’s 1833 “Force Bill”, a piece of legislation that would have
given the president power to enforce federal authority in South Carolina.
Notwithstanding, Milligan remained loyal to Jackson while blaming his decisions on bad
advisors. 107 Milligan’s desire and training to be an attorney is unclear but we do know
that on October 27, 1835 he passed the Ohio bar examination. He was among a group of
nine new lawyers that day, one of which included Edwin M. Stanton.108 In April 1838,
Milligan was selected as a county delegate to the Democratic Convention where he spoke
out against banks and supported the South’s constitutional right to slavery.109 In the fall
of 1845, Milligan moved to Huntington County, Indiana where he repeatedly failed in
various elections as a Democrat. By this time, he had established himself as a proslavery,
Northern Democrat sympathizer of the South. In 1848, Milligan sought the nomination
for state senator but lost and in 1850 sought the nomination for state representative but
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lost again. For the next eight years he returned to the full-time practice of law before he
was elected Huntington Township Trustee in 1858.110 In 1860, he again attempted higher
office when he sought the nomination for attorney general but lost once more. With
public office continuing to evade him, Milligan decided to put his political energies
toward another Democrat. He vigorously campaigned for Stephen Douglas but after the
election Milligan took a strong-pro secession stance.111
From its very outset, Milligan vehemently opposed the war and made it his life’s
work to do everything he could to protect the Constitution’s “first principles”: the
constitutionality of slavery and the rights of nullification and secession. Shortly after the
attack on Fort Sumter, one local Huntington County resident noted, “Mr. Milligan even
went so far as to say that he would rather spit upon the stars and stripes than to see them
at the head of an army marching.”112 Even his own neighbors questioned his loyalty.
Milligan began to make a name for himself among Peace Democrats, or Copperheads,
accepting invitations to speak across northern Indiana and giving speeches to large and
eager audiences while passionately declaring his message of resistance to the draft, the
Emancipation Proclamation, and Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus. He was even so
bold as to urge the Northwest to secede from the Union and ally itself with the
Confederacy. By the end of the summer, Republican governors of Ohio, Indiana, and
Illinois were increasingly concerned about the growing threats of insurrection by
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Milligan and other like-minded Copperheads. From the very start of the war many
Southerners hoped that a series of victories would sow a seed of defeatism among
Northwestern states such as Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, leading to their desertion of
the Union war cause. Many Northern Copperheads strongly believed in this possibility
and laid plans to formulate a “Northwestern Confederacy.”113
In Indiana’s 1862 congressional elections, Democratic candidates seized onto the
public resentment of the Lincoln administration’s actions regarding the Emancipation
Proclamation, military arrests, and suppression of the Democratic press. Indiana
Democrats took back control of both chambers of the General Assembly. When the new
General Assembly opened in January 1863, the Democrats vowed to remove Indiana’s
Republican governor, Oliver P. Morton from office.114 Indiana Republicans of course
resisted Democratic attempts at seizing the governor’s wartime powers. By bolting from
the statehouse, Republicans denied Democrats a quorum. This successfully sidelined the
Copperheads and negated their electoral victory, but it also meant there could be no
constitutional state budget. Instead of recalling the legislature to fund the state, Governor
Morton received funds from the War Department, Republican county governments, and
private bankers in New York. In effect, Morton illegally ran the State of Indiana without
the Democrats, leading to even more Copperhead disaffection.115
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Past scholarship on Copperheadism has downplayed the threat of this group,
particularly Richard O. Curry and Frank L. Klement who argued that perceived
Copperhead anti-war activity was simply a product of Republican propaganda used to
snuff out political dissent. 116 Mark Neely, in The Fate of Liberty, argued that the
Copperhead threat was exaggerated.117 However, in 2006, Jennifer Weber’s book
Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North showed that
Northern anti-war sentiment was so strong that Peace Democrats almost took control of
the entire party in 1864. She also pointed out that the Copperheads were very effective in
undermining Northern military manpower and that in response Lincoln had to divert
troops to New York to quell the anti-draft rioters in 1863.118 Archivist Stephen Towne’s
2015 book, Surveillance and Spies in the Civil War: Exposing Confederate Conspiracies
in America’s Heartland, is the most comprehensive study of Copperheadism to date.
Steeped in archival material, this book echoes Weber, in that there was, in fact, an actual
and present Copperhead threat in the state of Indiana during the Civil War. Through the
lens of U.S. Army intelligence operations, Towne uncovers plot after plot, aimed at not
only disrupting Lincoln’s war effort but bringing the war to an end.119
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Weber and Towne’s assessments of Copperheads as a real and serious threat to
the Northern war effort echoed nineteenth century Republican opinion. On July 12, 1864
James A. Sheahan, of the Chicago Post, wrote
All people will recollect [that the Northwestern
Confederacy] was a common topic of conversation in the
spring of 1862 among ‘Northern men of Southern
principles,’ who scouted the idea that Grant would take
Vicksburg as they are now pooh-poohing the idea that he
will take Richmond. In all the larger cities of the
Northwest, and in many of the smaller ones, these
Northwestern Confederacy disunionists were bold in
avowing and vociferous in advocating the traitorous
scheme.120
What exactly was this traitorous scheme? According to federal agents, Lambdin P.
Milligan, and other Copperheads like him, planned to overthrow state governments by
stealing a cache of army issue arms and liberating several prisoner-of-war camps, starting
with Camp Douglas in Chicago during the Democratic National Convention in August
1864. Milligan and his co-defendants were all members of the Sons of Liberty, a
clandestine Copperhead organization, led by Clement L. Vallandigham, dedicated to
helping the South win the war by carrying out paramilitary operations. Testimony at
Milligan’s trial further suggested that the organization was also in communication with
Richmond, which sent agents from Canada with money to pay certain designated
Copperhead leaders to formulate uprisings.121 To be sure, the testimony that was offered
during the Military Commission was dubious at best. Witnesses provided vague and
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conflicting accounts of the times and locations of numerous Sons of Liberty meetings and
the issues discussed at those meetings. A large portion of the trial consisted of character
testimony, delving into the trustworthiness and patriotism of the defendants rather than
actual evidence that would pin them to an actual conspiracy.
In addition to opposing emancipation and black equality, Copperheads saw
themselves as the political descendants of Jackson and Jefferson, who both at least
rhetorically supported limited government. Like Jackson and Jefferson, Copperheads
grounded themselves in a relatively libertarian-sounding variant of republicanism, fearing
tyranny and usurpation from the Federal Government, and upholding a “strict
construction” of the Constitution. It is understandable that their rhetoric concerning
government power and the Constitution harkened back to the Anti-Federalists and
Jefferson’s subsequent conflict with Hamilton. Of course, along with their political
convictions, Copperheads, or Peace Democrats, simply wanted the war to be over and
Blacks to remain enslaved in the South. While they were generally sympathetic toward
the South, they envisioned a united country, not a divided one. Together with their
political roots and wartime goals, their slogan became, “The Constitution as it is, the
Union as it was, and the nigger where he belongs.”122
Additionally, Copperheads can be generally considered the militant wing of the
Peace Democrats, but among Republicans that line was somewhat vague. In Indiana, the
Johnson County Republicans declared that “in the present calamities of our government,
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we recognize no party line but that drawn between loyalty and disloyalty-between those
who sustain the government and those who oppose it.”123 Despite the Peace Democrats’
insistence that they remained loyal to the Union even though they did not support the war
policies of President Lincoln, Republicans refused to distinguish them from Copperheads.
In fact, Democratic leaders, in the spring of 1863, realized the party was unprepared for
the large-scale political violence many Copperheads were encouraging. However, as
historian Robert H. Churchill points out, Indiana Republican public speeches and private
letters began to use “Democrat and Copperhead” interchangeably. Joining Klement,
Churchill concludes that this mindset produced violence toward non-Copperhead Peace
Democrats that many times bordered on the ridiculous. In Sullivan County, Indiana,
Republicans assaulted a female member during church, held her down, and forcibly
stripped her of a butternut pin (a badge symbolizing Southern heritage of many
Democrats, not necessarily Copperheads).124
Jennifer Weber identifies three distinct phases in the Copperhead’s development.
The first phase began during the secession crisis. While some Copperheads supported the
Confederacy, this was just a minority view. Many opposed the war but thought secession
was legal as the Constitution did not expressly forbid it. What really upset them were
Lincoln’s actions in response to secession. As noted earlier, these Peace Democrats held
extremely racists views, even more so than most nineteenth-century Americans. The
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second phase, therefore, began when Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation.
Copperheads were livid. They already blamed Abolitionist for the war, but now they
really feared what freedmen would do to northern jobs, not to mention the virtue of
northern women. The third phase began in 1864, the lowest point for the Lincoln
administration. By the summer, Union armies had all but stopped on all fronts and the
death toll seemed to grow by the day. Northerners who were previously supportive of the
war began to demand an end to the slaughter. For a brief time, Copperheads enjoyed a
spike in their ranks but as Grant started to push forward again with victories, those new
peace recruits ran back to Lincoln’s corner.125
By August 1864, the arrival of troops from Secretary of War Edwin Stanton
forestalled the Sons of Liberty plot to liberate Confederate prisoners held at Camp
Douglas. Federal agents had been watching these kinds of secret societies since 1861 and
in 1864 they started to close in on the Knights of the Golden Circle. The members
quickly disbanded and reorganized themselves into the Sons of Liberty. Unfortunately
for them, by late summer 1864, federal agents had once again infiltrated their ranks and
discovered the Chicago plot along with those involved. In the meantime, through
undercover agents in Canada, arms and ammunition were found at Harrison Dodd’s
printing office along with correspondence from Milligan.126
Based on reports from federal agents, on October 5, 1864, Lambdin P. Milligan,
along with co-conspirators Harrison H. Dodd, Horace Heffren, William A. Bowles,
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Stephen Horsey, and Andrew Humphrey were arrested for conspiracy to incite
insurrection and disloyal practices in the state of Indiana. Commander of the District of
Indiana, General Henry B. Carrington, wanted the defendants tried in a civilian court but
Indiana Governor Oliver P. Morton and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton wanted to use a
more expedient method by trying the men before a military commission. Unfortunately
for the government, before the trial was even convened, Dodd escaped into Canada. He
was tried and found guilty in absentia by the Military Commission.127 Between October
21 and December 6, Milligan, Heffren, Bowles, Horsey, and Humphrey were tried before
a military commission in Indianapolis on charges of “conspiracy against the government
of the United States, affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the
United States, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and violation of the laws of war.”
The specific charge for the violation of the laws of war “consisted of an attempt, through
a secret organization, to give aid and comfort to rebels.”128 This was, of course, in
reference to their plan to liberate the prisoner of war camp and arm Confederate
soldiers.129
This conspiracy was first formulated in the summer of 1864. According to
testimony, the plan was to seize the federal arsenals in Columbus, Ohio, Indianapolis,
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Indiana, and Chicago, Alton, and Rock Island, Illinois and free Confederate soldiers
imprisoned in those states. The Confederate soldiers, alongside groups of Copperheads,
would then overthrow each of these states’ governments and establish provisional
governments. The starting point of the uprising was planned for the Democratic National
Convention. Clement Vallandigham would make such an inflammatory speech at the
Convention that the Democrats of Chicago would rise up and assist the armed men of the
Sons of Liberty in liberating the Confederate soldiers. The Sons of Liberty were a
Copperhead group formed in 1864 that operated in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, and
Missouri. Essentially, the goal was to draw Sherman northward and away from the South
which would presumably result in some form of negotiation settlement whereby the
South would keep their slaves and the “Union as it was” would be restored. However,
federal agents had infiltrated the Sons of Liberty and uncovered the plot. By August 20th,
Indiana Governor Morton discovered that arms had been shipped to Harrison H. Dodd in
Indianapolis. Dodd’s office was searched and the arms and various incriminating letters
were seized.130
When the Democratic National Convention convened in Chicago, the city’s
Republican newspapers announced the presence of large numbers of Sons of Liberty.
Federal agents kept watch over the city and reinforcements stood guard at the prisoner of
war camp, Camp Douglas. The Convention ignored Vallandigham and nominated
George B. McClellan instead. With the plot falling apart before their eyes, the leaders of
the Sons of Liberty stood down from their revolt. A few days after the Convention
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ended, Dodd, Grand Commander of the Sons of Liberty in Indiana, was arrested.
Bowles, Milligan, Horsey, Humphreys, and Heffren were arrested soon thereafter.131
The Military Commission convened on October 21, 1864 in the United States
Court House in Indianapolis. The detail for the Commission was comprised of thirteen
senior military officers, of which six were in command of Indiana volunteer regiments.
Each defendant was permitted to retain his own counsel. Joseph E. McDonald and John
R. Coffroth were engaged to represent Milligan and Horsey. McDonald was a former
Democratic Congressman and State’s Attorney from Indiana. He had also defeated
Milligan in the Democratic nomination for Governor in 1864.132 Coffroth was an old
friend of Milligan and fellow Peace Democrat. Indianapolis Republican attorney
Jonathan W. Gordon was appointed to represent Humphreys, Bowles, and Heffren.133
Once the attorneys for the accused were approved by the Commission, the
defendants objected to the Commission’s jurisdiction on the basis that they were all
United States citizens and thus entitled to be tried in a civil court. After deliberation, the
Commission ruled that the question of jurisdiction would be determined at the conclusion
of the trial.134 J.W. Gordon, attorney for Humphreys, Bowles, and Heffren, made a
motion for separate trials of the accused. He reasoned, “We put this plea on the
discretion of this Court, as governed by the common law, believing that these defendants
have interests that cannot be sub-served by trying them together, and as a matter of
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justice I ask the Court for their severance on trial.”135 Again, after deliberation, the
Commission determined that no rights of the accused would be prejudiced by a joint trial.
When it came to trying civilians before military commissions during the Civil
War, there were no special procedures. The commission that tried Milligan and his codefendants followed the same rules of court-martials that tried soldiers. Military
commissions drew their authority from the commanding general.136 Essentially, the
general had unilateral power to select members of the commission from among his own
officers. The defendant was able to challenge the members and attempt to discredit their
objectivity, but the commission members themselves were the ones to rule on such
objections. The commission members, consisting of at least five officers, also decided the
outcome of the case, the sentence, and procedural objections.137 The Judge Advocate
played the role of both prosecutor and judge. As judge, he was often asked to deliver to
the commission legal opinions as objections or questions of law were raised. 138
Military commission procedures did have some advantages over civilian courts from the
perspective of the defendant. A complete trial transcript was kept, which was not the
case in most civilian courts at the time.139 Therefore, the reviewing body had a record
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from which they could refer to thus providing a more judicious assessment of the
defendant’s case.
The origins of military commissions in America extend back to the early days of
the country itself. In June of 1775, as the American Revolution began to escalate, the
Continental Congress adopted 69 Articles of War, drawn largely from the British Articles
of War.140 These Articles of War were administered exclusively by the legislature and
framed the procedures for courts-martial of soldiers, not civilians.141 A court-martial is
not a military commission however. A court-martial is used to apply military law to
members of the U.S. military. A military commission applies the laws of war and is used
to try unlawful enemy combatants or enemy combatants who are charged with violations
of the laws of war. In 1787, Samuel Carter, a citizen of New Jersey, was arrested for
delivering arms to the British. General George Washington immediately ordered Carter
to be transferred to a New Jersey civilian court stating, “[I am] not fully satisfied of the
legality of trying an inhabitant of any State by Military Law, when the Civil authority of
that State has made provisions for the punishment of persons taking Arms with the
Enemy.”142 Despite being seventy-nine years apart, Washington’s analysis somewhat
mirrors Davis’s analysis on the constitutionality of military trials of civilians.
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Constitutional scholar Louis Fisher notes that with the ratification of the United
States Constitution in 1787 and the subsequent creation of a new American government,
military power stemmed from legislative authority as it did during the war. Pursuant to
the Constitution, the President was made Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy but
at the same time was made accountable and subordinate to civilian law. Under Section 8
of Article I of the Constitution, it was Congress who was given the power “To define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas and Offenses against the Law of
Nations” and “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces.” As we have seen, this was not Lincoln’s view at all. Again, he believed that his
authority as Commander-in-Chief stemmed from international law and the state of
rebellion that existed during the Civil War.
In 1789, legislation was passed that essentially adopted the Articles of War that
had been used during the Revolutionary War. In pertinent part, they stated that military
troops, “shall be governed by the rules and articles of war which have been established by
the United States in Congress assembled.”143 In April 1806, Congress enacted a bill that
consisted of 101 Articles of War, many of which, like the previous Articles of War, set
forth the rules and procedures for courts-martial. However, language was added to
address spies. Specifically, “all persons not citizens of, or owing allegiance to the United
States of America, who shall be found lurking as spies…shall suffer death…by sentence
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of a general court marital.”144 During the Civil War, this same language would be
incorporated into the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which provided for the trial of civilians
by military commissions.
One of the first instances in which military commissions were used to try civilians
was during the War of 1812 when General Andrew Jackson declared martial law
throughout the city of New Orleans.145 After the British were defeated Jackson
maintained the state of martial law. Louis Louallier, a New Orleans resident, wrote an
article in a local newspaper declaring that citizens accused of a crime should be tried
before a civil court, not a military tribunal, and stated that Jackson’s order was “no longer
compatible with our dignity and our oath of making the Constitution respected.” On
March 5, 1815, General Jackson had Louallier arrested for inciting mutiny and
disaffection within the army. However, when Federal District Judge Dominick Hall
granted a writ of habeas corpus for Louallier, Jackson arrested the Judge as well. Jackson
was later fined $1,000 for his actions by Judge Hall himself.146 Long before the civil
liberties issues of the Civil War, we see an emerging argument over the use of military
commissions.
Military commissions were once again used to try civilians during the Mexican
American War. When American soldiers invaded Mexico, they did not have a stable
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legal system to prosecute those who violated the law of war. Therefore, General
Winfield Scott declared a state of martial law in Mexico for both American soldiers and
Mexican citizens. However, when Secretary of War William Marcy submitted a bill to
authorize these military tribunals, Congress refused to consider it. In circumnavigating
the lack of Congressional authority, Scott issued General Orders No. 20 on February 19,
1847. This order defined specific crimes committed by civilians and American soldiers
and declared that those crimes would be tried before military commissions. Scott never
did receive Congressional permission for his military commissions and after the war the
Supreme Court overturned many of Scott’s actions and the actions of other officers who
ordered military trials of civilians.147
In Jecker v. Montgomery (1852), the Supreme Court ruled that under the
Constitution, judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as
Congress shall establish. Neither the executive nor any of its military officers could
establish a court in a conquered country. In a unanimous decision, written by Justice
Taney, the Court stated that military commissions established in Mexico “were nothing
more than the agents of military power” and “were not courts of the United States, and
had no right to adjudicate.”148 These early legal challenges to military commissions did
not yet revolve around civil liberties however. Instead they relied on the usurpation of
executive power. It would take civil libertarian-minded jurists, like David Davis, to bring

147
148

Ibid., 11-14.
Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 How. (54 U.S.) 498, 515 (1852).

69

constitutional liberalism to the forefront of the law in order to establish a conversation
about civil liberties during wartime.
The most expansive use of military commissions, however, occurred not in a
foreign country, but rather on domestic soil during the American Civil War. It was
during this four year domestic rebellion when civil liberties issues would appear on a
grand scale. These Civil War-era military commissions were not initially established by
Congress but rather by President Lincoln and his field commanders. In many situations,
particularly in the Border States, the loyalty of civil courts was deemed questionable.
Military law therefore, replaced civilian law to ensure offenses such as resisting the draft,
disloyal speech, and the overthrow of state government would be adequately dealt with.
After declaring martial law and establishing military commissions in areas such as
Missouri and Maryland, President Lincoln convinced Congress to recognize and approve,
retroactively, his Presidential acts. In 1863, one particular piece of legislation declared
“all persons…found lurking as spies…shall be triable by a general court-martial or
military commission.”149 Many federal judges during the war, like Taney and Perkins,
attempted to maintain their authority to uphold the rule of law but were either curtailed or
simply ignored by military officials.150 It was on this legal battleground where Milligan
was taken from the ordinary course of civilian law and tried before a military
commission.
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The treason trial of Milligan and his co-defendants reconvened on October 22,
1864. In addition to reserving the question of the Military Commission’s jurisdiction
until after the trial, during the examination of William M. Harrison on October 22, a Sons
of Liberty pamphlet entitled, “Proceedings of the Grand Council of the State of Indiana,”
was entered into evidence by the Judge Advocate before the defense had an opportunity
to examine and challenge it. Harrison’s attorney objected stating, “In all courts of justice,
before a document can be offered into evidence, all these distinct facts as to its identity
are gone into and proved. And when a document has once gone into evidence, we cannot
object to it. If it goes in evidence on insufficient identity, how are we to remedy it?”151
In other words, proper procedure under the common law dictated that the defense have
the opportunity to review the evidence and to object to it. The Commission, however,
overruled the objection and the pamphlet was let into evidence. This was not a common
law court.
The Military Commission also accepted into evidence one particular speech
Milligan made in August 1864, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. W.L. Bush, a reporter for the
Cincinnati Gazette, testified as to the content of this speech.
Q: State to the court what was said by Mr. Milligan on the
state of the country, whether it was prosperous or
otherwise?
A: He referred to the country as desolated by this war, and
the oppressions of the Administration. That was the
general tenor of his remarks on that point.
Q: What did he state in reference to the freedom of the
press and of speech?
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A: He spoke of the freedom of speech allowed as simply
that granted by a Lincoln mob-as a freedom in name rather
that in fact.
Q: What did he say in reference to the draft or
conscription?
A: He stated, if the war was right, the draft was right, and if
they considered the war right, and were good citizens, they
would not grumble about the draft.
Q: What else did he say about the rightfulness of the war?
A: He denied the war was right, and proceeded to argue,
that under the Constitution the President had no power to
coerce a State.
Q: What did he say about the President of the United
States?
A: He spoke of him as a tyrant, and an usurper, I think.
Q: Did he denounce arbitrary arrests?
A: I think he did.

No direct evidence was ever introduced that Milligan did anything other than oppose the
war and vehemently criticize the Lincoln administration. Yet, the Military Commission
interpreted his speech to be treasonous and disloyal. Milligan’s attorney, on the other
hand, argued his client was simply being punished for criticizing a Republican
administration’s prosecution of a war he did not believe in. Testimony concluded and
closing arguments were presented on December 6. After deliberation, the Commission
found the defendants guilty and sentenced Milligan, Bowles, and Horsey to death and
Humphreys to hard labor for life.152
While waiting for his execution, Milligan sent a letter to his long-time friend,
Edwin Stanton, pleading for his intervention. “I have been condemned to die without
evidence,” he wrote, “please examine the facts and advise the President do this much for
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an old acquaintance and friend.”153 There is no evidence that Stanton replied. At the
same time, Milligan’s attorney, Joseph McDonald, who had practiced on the Illinois
circuit with Lincoln, traveled to Washington to personally request clemency for his client.
McDonald recorded his meeting with the President:
He went over the history of my client’s crimes as shown by
the papers in this case, and suggested certain errors and
imperfections in the record. The papers, he said, would
have to be returned for correction, and that would consume
no little time. “You may go home, Mr. McDonald,” he
said, with a pleased expression. “And I’ll send for you
when the papers get back; but I apprehend and hope there
will be such a jubilee over yonder,” he added, pointing to
the hills of Virginia just across the river, “we shall none of
us want any more killing done.”154
We, of course, cannot say for certain what Lincoln’s final decision would have been. He
was assassinated before the corrected papers could be returned. However, his comments
about no more killing suggests that he was planning to either commute Milligan’s
sentence or release him. Unfortunately, Lincoln’s assassination at the hand of a
Southerner ruined any hope of mercy for both the defendants and the South as a whole.
Caught up in the disquiet after Lincoln’s assassination, President Johnson vowed to
“make treason odious.”155 He ordered the execution of Milligan and his co-conspirators
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to be carried out on May 19, 1865, six days after he himself authorized the military trial
of those implicated in Lincoln’s assassination.156
In a last-ditch effort, Milligan’s lawyer sued for a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal circuit court in Indianapolis where David Davis sat on circuit duty. Meanwhile,
other attorneys and Milligan’s wife pleaded with President Johnson to commute
Milligan’s sentence to life in prison.157 Justice David Davis intervened as well by
traveling to Indianapolis to speak with Governor Morton, who had been one of the
leading voices in trying Milligan before a military commission in the first place. During
a Sunday afternoon ride, Davis attempted to convince Morton that the Military
Commission had been illegal since the civilian courts in Indiana had been open and
functioning and that martial law had not been declared in the state. Morton was
convinced to save Milligan’s life. The Governor reasoned that if the defendants had been
convicted unlawfully, he did not want to be responsible for it. He immediately wrote to
Johnson advising him to commute their sentences.158 This visit to Morton was the first of
many steps Davis took to directly intervene on Milligan’s behalf.
On May 10, 1865, Milligan’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed with the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana. It was heard the next day by
Judge David Davis, the Circuit Justice, and David McDonald, the District Judge.
Procedurally, a divided decision on the writ meant that the case would be elevated to the
United States Supreme Court. The next day, the two judges wrote a letter to President
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Johnson stating, “We beg leave also most respectfully to state that, aside from the legal
question, which we press most earnestly, we doubt the policy of the proposed execution.
We fear its effect upon the public mind in Indiana. By many, these men will be regarded
as political martyrs.”159 By today’s standards this would seem to be extremely
inappropriate. It should be noted that the judges started the letter by stipulating to the
defendants’ guilt and that their primary concern was that the Military Commission was
“unknown to Common Law.”160 Procedurally then, they asked Johnson to delay the
execution until the defendants had an opportunity to appeal their case to the Supreme
Court. While this letter seems to point to Davis’s political considerations concerning
military commissions, this strategy was most likely used to convince Johnson of the
political ramifications of executing the defendants in a state full of Peace Democrats. For
Davis though, proper legal procedures and civil liberties remained first and foremost.
While a Republican, Davis shared many of the political principles of Northern
Democrats regarding emancipation. In fact, throughout the war, Davis constantly advised
Lincoln on the dangers of waging a war against slavery. Illinois Republican Senator
Orville Browning wrote in his diary on January 19, 1863: "In conversation with Judge
Davis of the Supreme Court this morning he told me that he had a conversation with the
President yesterday in which he represented to him the alarming condition of things, and
urged upon him to reconstruct his cabinet, and change his [emancipation] policy, as the
only means of saving the Country. The President told him that this proclamation in regard
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to slavery was a fixed thing-that he intended to adhere to it, and whether he changed his
cabinet must be determined by future events."161 Davis’s advice to Lincoln to reverse
course on emancipation could be construed as evidence that his intent in Milligan was to
restrict black rights during Reconstruction South by returning judicial power to local
civilian courts including courts in the South. As explored in the last chapter, Davis was
not as progressive as Lincoln on issues of slavery and race.
Up until this point and as we will see in his majority opinion, Davis was simply
concerned with military commissions in the North. More importantly, though, it is
apparent that Davis went out of his way to ensure that Milligan’s case would reach the
Supreme Court, so that Radical Republican-backed military tribunals in the North, and
thus Republican partisanship, could be finally scrutinized before the highest court in the
land.
Following the request of Davis and McDonald, President Johnson initially would
not even review Milligan’s case. Johnson stated, “The very fact of the prisoner resorting
to the court upon a technical question of jurisdiction is a confession of guilt.”162 Without
leaving any reason for his change of mind, Johnson considered Davis and McDonald’s
plea and on May 30, 1865, commuted all the sentences to life in prison.
Even if Johnson had not commuted Milligan to life in prison, the habeas corpus
petition itself conformed to the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 in that a grand jury had
convened since Milligan’s arrest and submitted no indictment against him. According to
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the Act, therefore, Milligan should have been released from military custody. However,
if Davis and McDonald had issued the writ, they knew the military would simply
disregard it, as it had done so throughout the war. In fact, General Hovey was under
strict orders to ignore any habeas corpus writ issued by a civilian court. Therefore, after
hearing the petition, Davis and McDonald certified that they differed in opinion, thus
placing the case in the hands of the United States Supreme Court in accordance with
appellate procedure.163
Arguments before the Supreme Court were heard from March 5th to March 13th
1866, two months after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and at the same time
when the continuance of military rule in the South was being debated in the chambers of
Congress. For the government stood former General Benjamin Butler, Attorney General
James Speed, and Ohio attorney Henry Stanbery. The Petitioners were represented by
future U.S. President James A. Garfield, Jeremiah Black, and David Dudley Field, older
brother of Justice Stephen J. Field. Attorneys with cases before the Supreme Court were
usually only permitted two hours to argue. Three hours of argument were allotted for
each attorney in Milligan. At this time, the Supreme Court relied more on oral argument
than written briefs.164 The additional hour given to counsel may point to the possibility
that the members of the Court understood the importance of the case before them and
therefore wanted to give extra attention to both sides. It is also important to note that in
addition to arguing against expanded presidential war powers and martial law in order to
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discredit the Military Commission’s jurisdiction, counsel for Milligan also used the same
civil libertarian language that Judges Perkins and Davis had been using throughout the
war. In fact, many of the civil liberty arguments advanced by Milligan’s attorneys would
be incorporated into Davis’s own majority opinion. A more detailed analysis of this
opinion will be covered in the next chapter.
Henry Stanbery opened for the government, narrowing his remarks to the question
of jurisdiction. Benjamin Butler would argue on the merits. Stanbery argued that the
Supreme Court did not possess jurisdiction to review the case of Lambdin Milligan under
the Act of 1802, which prohibited the Supreme Court from hearing ex parte cases. He
stated, “All the cases before this court, during all the time that this jurisdiction has
existed, are cases between parties, and stated in the usual formula A. v. B…all the rules
of this court exclude the idea of an ex parte case under the head of appellate
jurisdiction.”165 The Judiciary Act of 1802 read:
That whenever any question shall occur before a circuit
court, upon which the opinions of the judges shall be
opposed, the point upon which the disagreement shall
happen, shall, during the same term, upon the request of
either party, or their counsel, be stated under the direction
of the judges, and certified under the seal of the court, to
the supreme court166
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For Stanbery, the language “upon the request of either party” intimated a cause of action
between two parties but since Davis and McDonald had only acted on behalf of Milligan
the situation did not meet the two party standard under the Act of 1802.167
But then Stanbery made what may be considered a blunder. Misreading and
misapplying an old Latin dictum, he argued “conventional and legislative laws and
enactments are silent amidst arms, and when the safety of the people becomes the
supreme law.”168 Here, we see perhaps the most radical expression of the necessity
argument that Lincoln had taken as commander-in-chief. To be clear, at this point
Lincoln had been assassinated and never made this argument. Stanbery argued that the
very nature of a domestic insurrection necessitated the expansion of presidential war
powers beyond legal constitutional limits. (Lincoln himself believed that presidential war
powers expanded, but within the Constitution by way of the commander-in-chief clause
and only within the limits of international law or the laws of war.) Furthermore, Stanbery
relied heavily on Lincoln’s habeas corpus proclamation of 1862 which provided for the
military trial of civilians.169
Attorney General James Speed then argued on the merits of the case. Butler
would later rejoin. Military commissions, according to Speed, established their authority
from martial law and that it was therefore only by military law that commission
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proceedings could have been reviewed. He then explained why military commissions
were vital to times of war.
It would be impossible for the commanding general of an
army to investigate each fact which might be supposed to
interfere with his movements, endanger his safety, aid his
enemy, or bring disorder and crime into the community
under his charge. He, therefore, must commit to his
officers, and in practice, to a board of officers, as a tribunal,
the charge of examining the circumstances and reporting
the facts in each particular case.170

Here, Speed made an exegesis of war argument. Because a commander in the field does
not have time to examine the dangers posed to his army by civilian populations under
martial law, military commissions must conduct such investigations for the safety of the
military force.
Speed also made the argument that the President as Commander-in-Chief is not
constrained by the Constitution. He stated that when Lincoln suspended habeas corpus
during the war, it “was an exercise of his sovereignty in carrying on war” and that “his
powers must be without limit. New difficulties [during war] are constantly arising, and
new combinations are at once to be thwarted, which the slow movement of legislative
action cannot meet.”171 In other words, according to Speed, Congress is wholly incapable
of keeping up with the ever-evolving nature of war and making decisions regarding those
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events. Following Speed’s logic then, the President is the only one who could make such
time sensitive decisions.
In regards to the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments, Speed contended that “these, in
truth, are all peace provisions of the Constitution and, like all other conventional and
legislative laws and enactments, are silent amidst arms, and when the safety of the people
becomes the supreme law.”172 Essentially, Speed was forwarding the argument that there
were no limitations on the war-making and war-conducting powers of Congress or the
President. This outlandish idea did not go over well with the Court. Justice Miller, in a
private letter, said that “the session of the Court has developed his utter want of ability as
lawyer-He is certainly one of the feeblest men who has addressed the Court this term.”173
Butler’s performance at the end of oral argument would not be any more convincing.
The case for the Petitioners was initiated by Republican James Garfield. He
opened with a breadth of both English and American legal history. In response to
Stanbery, Garfield argued, “The only ground on which the learned counsel attempts to
establish the authority of the military commission to try these petitioners is that of the
necessity of the case. I answer, there was no such necessity.”174 For Garfield, then,
necessity was simply a matter of geography.
But what is the nature of that necessity. If, at this
moment, Lee, with his rebel army at one end of
Pennsylvania Avenue, and Grant with his army of the
172

Speed, quoted in Klaus, 106.
Samuel Miller to Thomas Ewing, March 4, 1866, quoted in Charles Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller
and the Supreme Court (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), 118.
174
James Abram Garfield, “Argument of James Abram Garfield for the Petitioner,” quoted in
Klaus, The Milligan Case, 114.
173

81

Union at the other…were approaching this Capitol…I
have no doubt they would expel Your Honors from the
bench. The jurisdiction of battle would supersede the
jurisdiction of law. This court would be silenced by the
thunders of war. It has been fully settled that those states
constituted a belligerent government de facto, against
which the federal government might extend absolute
military jurisdiction over every foot of rebel territory.175

It should be noted that “necessity” was not just a catchphrase used by Lincoln and
his military commanders in the field. Rather it was the rationale for the entire laws of
war and of the Emancipation Proclamation. Garfield was drawing the line of necessity in
a geographical sense. He also admitted that there were times in which civilian law was
silent. “But the military jurisdiction does not extend beyond the territory of the rebellious
states, expect where the tide of war actually sweeps beyond the limits and makes it
impossible for the civil courts to exercise their functions.”176 During the drafting of his
majority opinion, Davis would take the same geographical standard for necessity.
Garfield clarified his position by stating to the Court that he did not want a
decision that would restrict Congressional authority in Reconstruction South. Having no
such necessity in the North, argued Garfield, Milligan should have been charged under
criminal law, not military law. On the issue of whether the Constitution was “silent”
during the war, Garfield pronounced, “Such a doctrine…is too monstrous to be tolerated
for a moment. The just and final settlement of this great question will take a high place
among the great achievements which have immortalized this decade. It will establish
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forever this truth, that a republic can wield the vast enginery [sic] of war without
breaking down the safeguards of liberty.”177 In other words, contrary to Stanbery’s
argument, the abrogation of civil liberties should not be the absolute rule in times of war.
In fact, his argument would closely follow Davis’s majority opinion, in that he supported
military commissions in certain cases, that of those in the South where an actual state of
war existed. Davis would also go on to follow Garfield’s defense of the Bill of Rights in
that, “the Constitution and the laws of the United States have carefully provided for the
protection of individual liberty and the right of accused persons to a speedy trial before a
tribunal established and regulated by law.”178 Here we see the emergence of
constitutional liberalism in which the law is centering on individual liberties.
Democrat Jeremiah Black, former Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, Attorney General, and Secretary of State under Buchanan addressed the Court
next. Black explained that the “strange tribunal” under which his clients were tried
possessed neither the jurisdiction to convict them or even hear the case itself. He
explained by referencing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, “which was passed with
express reference to persons precisely in the situation of these men, declares that they
shall be delivered up for trial to the proper civil authorities.”179 According to this act, if
an individual was being detained by an executive order and was not indicted by a grand

177

Garfield quoted in Klaus, 119.
Garfield quoted in Klaus, 125.
179
Jeremiah S. Black, “Argument of Jeremiah S. Black for the Petitioner,” quoted in Klaus, The
Milligan Case, 123.
178

83

jury, he was to be released. Black pointed out that Milligan had not been indicted by a
grand jury and was therefore held illegally by military authorities.
After the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 was passed on September 15, Republicans
were more at ease about Lincoln’s actions. Now there was legislative authority to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In short, by this act, Congress had
endorse the president’s earlier unilateral suspensions. Yet, civil liberties issues continued
to be debated among Democrats. They commented on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863
saying, “his own party admitted his usurpation long afterward, and after hundreds of like
cases had occurred, by passing an act of Congress to save him from the consequences of
his arbitrary use of power.”180 Ironically, the act was now being used by a Democratic
attorney to defend a Peace Democrat who had publically denounced Lincoln.
Moving up from statutory construction to constitutional law, Black also argued
that Indiana was not in a theatre of war when Milligan was arrested and “the courts were
wide open, where judicial process was executed every day without interruption, and
where all the civil authorities, both State and National, were in full exercise of their
functions.”181 According to Black, Milligan should not have been tried by a military
commission because under the suspension clause suspension was only allowed in time of
actual invasion or rebellion. To this he tacitly added, in the location of actual invasion or
rebellion as well. Davis would reach the same conclusion in his majority opinion and
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conclusively declare that military commissions in the North were illegal where the
civilian courts were open and functioning.
Scholars such as Stephen Towne have argued that evidence suggests that
“political leaders chose not to try the conspirators in civilian courts speaks to their lack of
faith in the judicial process at a time of national emergency rather than the lack of
evidence of conspiracy.”182 For Towne, Copperheads did in fact possess a threat to the
Midwest and the war in general. In accordance with his client’s best interests, it seems
Black implied the Copperhead movement was not a serious threat to the war effort and
that therefore there was not a real invasion or rebellion. Agreeing with Black, Davis
would declare that Indiana was not in a state of war and thus Milligan should have been
turned over to a civilian court.
During Reconstruction, this theatre of war argument would resurface. Despite
Davis’s opinion in Milligan, military trials of civilians continued. However, from July
1867 to March 1877, the southern states were technically under martial law by virtue of
congressionally created military districts, thus justifying the continuation of military
commissions. Radical Republicans who set up these military districts and tribunals
understood that they were necessary to protect freedmen from an all-white southern
judicial system but Davis’s majority opinion seemingly put them back into place. As we
will see though, Davis’s opinion was not intended to prohibit military commissions in the
Reconstruction South as Radical Republicans thought.
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Black, like Garfield, also invoked the 6th Amendment of the Bill of Rights in
defense of Milligan:
[W]hen they [founding fathers] came to frame a
government for themselves and their posterity, had
failed to insert a provision making the trial by jury
perpetual and universal, they would have proved
themselves recreant to the principles of that liberty
of which they professed to be the special
champions.183

Black was arguing that the founders understood that citizens in a democracy could not be
ruled by a government that punished without restraint. Furthermore, “[t]hey went over
Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, and the rules of the common law,
and whatever was found there to favor individual liberty they carefully inserted in their
own system.”184 Davis would take the same “strict constructionist” view, in that the
Constitution applies both in war and in peace. As Robert H. Churchill explains in To
Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face: Libertarian Political Violence and the Origins of
the Militia Movement, “strict construction” in this context reflects an Antifederalist rather
than a Federalist understanding of proper constitutional construction. This makes sense
in light of Copperhead support of state’s rights and Davis’s defense of Peace Democrats’
civil liberties during the war.
David Dudley Field, brother of Justice Stephen J. Field, closed the case for the
Petitioners by stating that the authority of Congress to establish martial law should not
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have been an issue since Congress had not established martial law at all. “The source and
origin of the power to establish military commissions, if it exists at all, is in the assumed
power to declare what is called martial law. I say what is called martial law; for, strictly
there is no such thing as martial law; it is martial rule.”185 Field went on to explain what
he meant by martial law as being no law at all. For Field, a liberal advocate of legal
codification and opponent of judge-made common law, the abolition of civil law could
only mean replacing civil law with the will of the military commander. The laws of war
were to diffuse and uncodified to have much meaning for him. In other words, by
extension of executive power, the president, had the power during a time of war to
suspend the Constitution and the laws of the nation and put himself in their place.
Lincoln had eventually come to adopt the international law position that as commanderin-chief he was restrained by the laws of war during the war. Field was arguing against
this. For Field, martial law was tantamount to a dictatorship, which had no authority in
the U.S. Constitution. At stake in Ex parte Milligan was whether uncodified international
law rooted in precedent and legal treatise would have a place in American jurisprudence
or whether constitutional liberalism and the Bill of Rights would reign supreme for civil
liberties even during wartime.
Like his co-counsel, Field defended the Bill of Rights over international law,
specifically the 5th Amendment. Field stated that it was “made for a state of war as well
as a state of peace; it was aimed at the military authority, as well as the civil; and it was
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as explicit as our mother tongue could make them.”186 Again, this was almost verbatim
what Davis would write in his majority opinion when he wrote that the Constitution is a
law for rulers and people, in times of war and peace.187 It seems that while Davis
intervened in several civil liberties cases throughout the war, these other constitutional
liberal-minded attorneys began to contemplate the theoretical framework for
constitutional liberalism. Davis did not leave behind any writings that explained his state
of mind during oral argument or the drafting process, but it seems to be the case that
Field, Black, and Garfield helped Davis conceptualize the civil liberties issues that he had
already been fighting for. In other words, by creating a national military power and thus
putting a federal police power in the North had created the need for limits on that very
power. This in turn gave liberals like Field a chance to nudge common law judges like
Davis away from the quaint world of precedent and legal treatise and into the modern
world of legal liberalism.
Benjamin Butler replied for the government. As a general during the war, Butler
had declared martial law on New Orleans and tried numerous civilians by military
commissions. He too expounded on a plethora of precedents, including the famous 1864
case Ex parte Vallandigham in which the Supreme Court ruled that it had no authority to
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review the Military Commission that convicted Congressman Vallandigham since the
Military Commission was not considered a court under the Judicial Act of 1789.
According to Butler, it followed that the Court had no authority to review Milligan’s case
either.
Butler was wrong in his analysis however. In Vallandigham, the Court did not
have authority to review appeals directly from a military commission. In Milligan,
however, the appeal came from Davis and McDonald’s federal circuit court on a habeas
corpus petition. The Supreme Court did have authority to review appeals directly from
lower federal courts. Butler also addressed the president’s powers under martial law.
Quoting from Brown v. The United States (1814), Butler stated, “The sovereignty, as to
declaring war and limiting its effects, rests with the legislature. The sovereignty as to its
execution rests with the President.”188 Butler pointed out that Congress had ratified
President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus and establishment of martial law, thus
ending any debate over who had the power to initiate such acts.189
Arguments concluded on March 13, 1866. On April 3, the Court issued an order
directing the writ of habeas corpus be issued because the Military Commission had had
no jurisdiction to try and sentence the defendants. The opinion of the Court, however,
was not read until the beginning of the next term in December 1866. Judge David Davis
returned to Bloomington, Illinois to write what would become his legal career’s crowning
achievement. Joining Davis’s opinion for the majority were three of the four Democratic
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appointees from before the war, together with Stephen J. Field, a War Democrat
appointed by Lincoln. Joining the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Chase were
Lincoln appointees Swayne and Miller, as well as Justice Wayne, appointed by Jackson.
Davis had actually lobbied Lincoln to elevate Swayne to Chief Justice in 1864. In a letter
to the president, Davis pointed out that although Swayne had strong political opinions, he
had never been an active partisan. “To place a mere partisan in such a position weakens
an administration and lessens the respect that should attach to the decision of the
Court.”190 This letter illustrates, once again, Davis’s anti-Partyism specifically when it
came to the judiciary. Rising above the political fray became more than just lip-service
for Davis, it became his career’s endeavor. As we will see, his majority opinion in
Milligan was reflective of his own political restraint on the bench and his unwavering
concern over civil liberties.
Davis’s majority opinion and Chase’s concurring opinion were in agreement on
the fundamental issue that the trial and sentencing of Milligan by the Military
Commission was unconstitutional. Both opinions also rejected the Stanbery argument
that a civilian’s constitutional rights are suspended in times of war or rebellion, “inter
arma, silent leges.” However, on the point of congressional authority to establish
military commissions, the two opinions differed sharply. This aspect of Milligan would
be the hinge on which Radicals would view the opinion as a challenge to military
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commissions in the South. In order to fully understand Davis’s reasoning in Milligan, a
close reading and analysis of his majority opinion will be provided in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
“A LAW FOR RULERS AND PEOPLE” 191:
DAVID DAVIS’S MAJORITY
OPINION

“Not a word is said in the opinion [Ex parte Milligan] about reconstruction, & the
power [to try by military commission] is conceded in the insurrectionary States.”192 This
letter by Davis to his brother in law Julius Rockwell is conclusive in making the case that
Davis did not intend for Milligan to apply to the South. Yet, thorough historical analysis
dictates that we must look for other pieces of evidence to make the strongest argument
possible. So far, we have examined Davis’s wartime record in which he only intervened
in Northern military commissions while at the same time upholding Lincoln’s war time
actions in the Prize Cases. We must now look to the Milligan decision for further
analysis. In its historical context, certain legal niceties and the political aspects of
Davis’s majority opinion shaped the Radical Republican view that the opinion applied to
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the South, striking down military commissions there and thus eliminating one of the few
legal instruments to protect freedmen’s rights. Davis, in reality, was tempering wartime
excesses of nationalism and not leaving blacks to the mercy of Southerners. By
examining the opinion, we can then begin to appreciate why Radicals, understandably,
launched attacks on the Court in response to Milligan including reducing its members and
limiting its appellate jurisdiction, all of which contributed to Reconstruction’s alreadyexisting political instability and partisanship. We can also continue to trace Davis’s
evolution as a non-partisan civil libertarian, as he placed a heavy emphasis on the Bill of
Rights over international law.
On December 17, 1866, the following term after oral argument, the Court
delivered its opinion in what is now called the “Old Senate Chamber” at the Capitol
building. The room teemed with attorneys and members of Congress. Journalists from
the Associated Press and the Senate official reporter were ordered by the clerk of the
court not to take any notes whatsoever because the Court did not want anyone
misinterpreting or misstating the opinion. Not until January 1, 1867 was the opinion
published in full.193
Writing for the majority, Davis held that military commissions and the laws and
usages of war that establish them “can never be applied to citizens in states which have
upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process
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unobstructed.”194 Neither the President nor Congress had the authority to establish such
military trials. After outlining the facts of the case, including the proceedings of the
Military Commission, Davis provided an analysis of whether or not the Military
Commission had jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan. To this Davis concluded,
“The importance of the main question presented by this record cannot be overstated; for it
involves the very framework of the government and the fundamental principles of
American liberty.”195 With this sweeping statement, Davis began outlining a firm
remonstration of the government’s actions against Milligan and of others in the North
who had faced trial by military commissions. It was for those same Northern Peace
Democrats that he had intervened for throughout the Civil War.
He began by responding to Stanbery’s argument that the Supreme Court did not
have jurisdiction to hear Milligan’s case due to its ex parte nature and that all cases
before the Court had to have two opposing parties. Davis concluded that even though it
was docketed as an ex parte case, notice was given at the Circuit Court level to Indiana’s
District Attorney, who did in fact appear and agree to have the habeas corpus petition
certified by Davis and McDonald. When the two judges could not agree, it was
submitted to the Supreme Court for consideration.196 While not abundantly clear nor
even really vital to the heart of my principle contention, Davis concluded that he and his
colleagues could hear Milligan’s case as ex parte, due to the fact that the District
Attorney appeared in Circuit Court on behalf of the government. In other words, in
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Davis’s mind because the two opposing sides were present in Circuit Court (Milligan and
the District Attorney) it was not actually an ex parte case but rather a normal case
consisting of two parties.
In response to Butler’s argument that Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus
authorized the military arrest and trial of Milligan, Davis stated that, “The suspension of
the writ does not authorize the arrest of any one, but simply denies to one arrested the
privilege of this writ in order to obtain his liberty.”197 In other words, habeas corpus has
nothing to do with military trials, but rather the ability to challenge one’s detention.
Davis went on to acknowledge the circumstances under which the president had authority
to suspend the writ. He stated that when the public safety demanded, the president could
arrest a suspected person without giving a cause on return to a writ of habeas corpus.
“But it was not contemplated that such person should be detained in custody beyond a
certain fixed period, unless certain judicial proceedings, known to common law, were
commenced against him.”198 Taking line of argument from Black, Davis noted that
Milligan had not been indicted by a Grand Jury and that according to the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1863, he was thus entitled to be released from military custody.
Davis finally concluded that the Court did have jurisdiction to hear Milligan’s
case by virtue of the fact that the Supreme Court had the authority to review habeas
corpus petitions and in Milligan’s petition he plead that he had been detained under order
of the President, that he was a citizen of Indiana and had never been in the military, and
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that the Grand Jury in Indiana had adjourned without filing any indictment against him,
all in violation of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863.199
He then proceeded to address counsel’s arguments in chief but not before stating
the controlling question once more: Had the Military Commission jurisdiction to try and
sentence Milligan? Driving home the importance of the case before the Court, Davis
again pronounced, “No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which
more nearly concerns the rights of the whole people; for it is the birthright of every
American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished according to the
law.”200 That law, as he would spell out in his majority opinion, was the United States
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights. This would be in direct opposition to
Lincoln’s use of international law via the Commander-in-Chief clause.
When he took office, Lincoln’s knowledge and experience with international law,
specifically the laws of war, was negligible. Yet, over the course of the war he would
learn to use the laws of war to the North’s advantage and even go so far as to redefine
them. Historically, the laws of war had humanitarian limits. One of these limits was the
permanent confiscation of personal property. John Fabian Witt in Lincoln’s Code points
out, “Even if Lincoln had thought it prudent to emancipate slaves in Missouri (in
reference to General John Frémont’s emancipation declaration of 1861) he concluded that
the customs and usages of warfare prevented him from doing so.”201 But as the war wore
on, Lincoln stepped closer to emancipation. In May 1862, Major General David Hunter
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mirrored Frémont’s emancipation order, this time in South Carolina. Again Lincoln
revoked the order stating, “Whether at any time, in any case, it shall have become a
necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the government, to exercise such supposed
power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself.”202 Here we see
for the first time Lincoln envisioning the possibility of emancipation but only at the
necessary time defined by himself and only through his authority as Commander-inChief. In July 1862, Lincoln officially declared that emancipation of the slaves was a
necessary war measure warranted by military necessity. As Witt notes, “The military
necessity test tethered the means allowed to the justice of the end in view. Justice-God’s
justice-was precisely what Lincoln had in mind.”203 Because Lincoln believed the
North’s cause was just and superior, he redefined the humanitarian limits of confiscation
within the laws of war. It was the laws of war that also allowed for the criminal trial of
individuals by military commissions and that upheld the authority of the executive branch
in the role of Commander-in-Chief, as when Lincoln used emancipation as a military
necessity.204
William Blair in With Malice Toward Some: Treason and Loyalty in the Civil
War Era argues that while Lincoln did use international precedents in blockading the
South, emancipating slaves, and curtailing civil liberties such as habeas corpus, it is
doubtful that he consciously enlisted international law to defend his actions. When he
defended the Emancipation Proclamation in a letter to James C. Conkling, he explained
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how he used both domestic and international law. Lincoln insisted that the proclamation
endowed the Commander-in-Chief “with the law of war, in time of war.” He then asked,
“Is there-has there ever been-any question that by the law of war, property, both of
enemies and friends, may be taken when needed?”205 It was this wide interpretation of
the Commander-in-Chief Clause that Lincoln wielded to not only emancipate the slaves
and blockade Southern ports but more importantly authorizes the military trial of civilians
in the North.
Davis, in his majority opinion, continued with an analysis of the 4th Amendment,
forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures; the 5th Amendment, requiring indictment
by a grand jury and the right not to be denied of life, liberty, or property except by due
process; and the 6th Amendment, providing the right to a jury trial in all criminal cases;
all of which had, in his view, been violated by the Military Commission that convicted
Milligan. Davis contended that the Military Commission did not possess authority
because the 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendments were guaranteed to all United States citizens, in
war and peace. “These securities for personal liberty thus embodied, were such as
wisdom and experience and demonstrated to be necessary for the protection of those
accused of crime.”206

Therefore, according to Davis, the Constitution (Bill of Rights)

superseded the laws of war (international law.)
Davis then continued with perhaps the most famous passage of the opinion:
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The Constitution of the United States is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with it the shield of protection of all classes
of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.
No doctrine…was ever invented by the wit of man
than that any of its provisions can be suspended
during any of the great exigencies of government.
Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchism or
despotism…207

Here we see an apparent contradiction in terms. If the Constitution applies to all in both
peace and war, how could Milligan have applied only to those military commissions in
the North and not in the South? And would this not eliminate all protections for Black
defendants facing all white juries in the South just as Davis’s radical opponents
contended?
According to her provocative dissertation, Karin Petlack, in this period Black
freedom could come only at the expense of white civil liberties. For instance, in
Cincinnati when the war started, whites voted in a Democratic mayor whose racism and
corruption spread throughout the city. Frequent assaults on Blacks occurred. In 1863, a
Republican mayor was elected. Immediately he replaced the corrupt police force and a
new Union general was appointed to command the military district. This new general
issued an order that all persons supporting the Confederacy through actions or speech
would be arrested and subject to hanging. The restriction of white civil liberties allowed
African Americans to establish their first newspaper, expand their churches and school
board, and walk the streets of Cincinnati free from attacks by white citizens and the
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police.208 If Petlack is correct, then only military law could protect Black freedom during
the Civil War and Reconstruction. And it was precisely this military protection that
Davis seemed to deny to African Americans in Ex parte Milligan.
One could argue that this passage is a reflection upon Davis’s poor drafting
abilities, which he acknowledged himself. He may have been caught up in the fervor of
defending civil liberties that he was unaware of how contradictory his statement really
was. One could also argue that in the back of his mind, this standard could only be
applied to those who actually upheld and respected the laws of the federal government,
thus eliminating the states in actual rebellion.
Davis went on to explain that the Military Commission that tried Milligan was not
a legitimate court, established by Congress under Article III of the Constitution. Nor
could it have convened on the mandate of the President because his powers were limited
to executing the laws, not making them. Even Lincoln’s use of international law and the
Commander-in-Chief Clause did not authorize the use of military commissions,
according to Davis. The laws and usages of war “can never be applied to citizens in
states which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open
and their process unobstructed.”209
This was a crucial formulation. It was the first passage in Davis’s majority
opinion signaling that he intended Milligan to apply only to the North. If, according to
Davis, international law and thus military commissions could never be used in states
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where federal authority was upheld, then it follows that military commissions could be
used in the South where federal authority obviously had not been upheld. Like Black,
Davis also pointed out that the civilian courts were open and functioning in Indiana and
therefore “no usage of war could sanction a military trial there for any offence whatever
of a citizen in civil life, in no wise connected with the military service.”210 For Davis
then, international law (laws and usages of war) should not apply to non-combatant
citizens in areas where civilian courts were open and functioning.
In an obiter dicta regarding Congressional authorization of military commissions,
(a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause…and not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause,)211 Davis stated, “Congress could
grant no such power [to establish military commissions]; and to the honor of our national
legislature be it said, it has never been provoked by the state of the country even to
attempt its exercise.”212 The question of Congressional authority to convene military
commissions was not one of the issues raised before the Supreme Court in this case.
Davis acknowledged at the beginning of his majority opinion that the controlling question
in the case was whether the military commission had jurisdiction to try and sentence
Milligan. Yet, in his opinion, Davis went out of his way to declare that Congress could
not constitutionally authorize the use of these tribunals even if it chose to do so.
The Supreme Court’s role in deciding whether a Congressional law was
unconstitutional was first established by Chief Justice John Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck.
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In this 1810 case, Justice Marshall cautioned that the act of declaring a Congressional law
unconstitutional was “a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be
decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful case.”213 The Supreme Court, therefore, could
declare an act of Congress unconstitutional only if there were no other grounds for ruling
on the case in question. Despite the fact that Justice Fields went to great lengths in
pointing out that no question of Congressional authority was before the Court, the
majority opinion nonetheless maintained that Congress could not constitutionally
establish military commissions even if it had wanted to do so.
This obiter dicta statement was the spark that lit the fire of Radical Republican
opprobrium for Davis’s majority opinion. A more detailed analysis will be given in the
next chapter regarding Congressional Reconstruction, but at this point it is only necessary
to point out that Radicals would rely on military commissions in the South to protect
freedmen from all-white juries and judges who obviously were not concerned about their
civil and legal rights. Upon reading that Davis had apparently struck down their ability to
use military commissions in the South, they understandably felt attacked by the Court.
But if Davis intended for Milligan to only apply in the North, and allow military
commissions to remain in the South, why did he declare Congress unable to establish
them? A close reading of the opinion reveals that this obiter dicta statement was made in
the context of the laws and usages of war being unconstitutional in those states that
upheld the authority of the federal government and whose civilian courts were open and
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functioning. Executive use of military law where the authority of the federal government
was unquestioned and where the courts were open and functioning WAS constitutional. I
contend, therefore, that while not stated as clearly as it could have been, Davis was trying
to say that while neither Congress nor the Executive had the authority to establish
military commissions in the North, he was leaving open the ability of Congress and not
the Executive to establish military commissions in the South.
A letter written by Davis to his brother-in-law, Julius Rockwell, in 1867 may shed
some light on Davis’s obiter dicta statement. On February 24, Davis wrote:
The right to try by a military tribunal was claimed as an
executive power. We held that the provisions of the
constitution were irrepealably (sic) and could not be
suspended. Did it not logically follow that Congress could
not repeal? Believing as we did that the whole thing was
fundamental, would it not at once have been unmanly and
unworthy a court to have confirmed the denial to the
executive and would it not at once have been claimed that
we admitted Congress could do it? How can a provision be
irrepealable and yet Congress repeal it, disregard it, or
suspend it? The whole argument, such as it is, is to show
the irrepealable character of the amendments; nothing
else.214

Whether this was Davis’s actual logic at the time he drafted Milligan is uncertain. Yet, if
we take him at face value, Davis was simply stating that due to the Constitution’s
inviolable nature, since the President could not authorize military commissions in the
North, Congress could not either. Thus the Constitution is a law for all rulers and people.
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But while it is misleading, even here Davis was NOT saying that Congress could note
establish military commissions in the South. In his letter to Rockwell, Davis continued,
“I used the words ‘Congress could grant no such power’ in the wrong place, but in the
subsequent part of the opinion I think I proved it.”215 While Davis was not specific as to
what he meant here, nor did he explain where he should have placed it, a continued
analysis of his majority opinion will show that he intended for Milligan to apply only to
military commissions in the North.
In rejecting Stanbery and Butler’s argument that martial law authorized the use of
military commissions, Davis agreed with Garfield and Field’s arguments that no such
proposition can stand under a republican government since martial law renders the
military independent and superior to civil authority. Yet, he acknowledged that the
nation should not always expect to have “wise and humane” rulers. “Wicked men,
ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once
occupied by Washington and Lincoln.”216 Davis argued that the Founders knew there
would be times of war and that abuses of power were more likely to occur during these
periods of calamities. Therefore, they included certain safeguards that could not be
disturbed, except for habeas corpus. Davis recognized that during the Civil War there
was an emergency that demanded the government should not be required to have
produced the persons arrested in answer to a writ of habeas corpus. “The Constitution
goes no further. It does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is denied a citizen, that he
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shall be tried otherwise than by the course of the common law.”217 As he had stated
earlier in rejection of Butler’s argument that Lincoln’s suspension of the writ justified the
use of military commissions, Davis again emphatically stated that habeas corpus has
nothing to do with the trial process. It is simply an instrument to be used to determine the
legality of one’s detention. No mention is made of their trial outside of the normal civil
judicial process when those civil courts are open.
In adopting Garfield’s assertion that no military necessity was present in
Milligan’s situation that justified martial law, Davis stated that martial law “cannot arise
from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real,
such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration.”218 Davis went
on to state that there are instances in which martial law may be established, specifically in
foreign invasion or civil war, when the courts are actually closed, and where the theatre
of active military operations exist. “It is also confined to the locality of actual war.
Because, during the late Rebellion it could have been enforced in Virginia, where the
national authority was overturned and the courts driven out, it does not follow that it
should obtain in Indiana.”219 Here, Davis clearly established his belief that martial law,
the replacement of civilian law by military law, could be used in the South but not in the
North.
In closing, Davis admitted that if Milligan had been found guilty of the crimes
imputed to him by a civilian court, he should have faced severe punishment. For Davis
217
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though, it was not easy for him to see how Milligan could have been treated as a prisoner
of war, liable under the laws of war, “when he lived in Indiana for…twenty years, was
arrested there, and had not been, during the late troubles, a resident of any of the states in
rebellion.”220 The fact that he was accused of being involved in a plot, however
improbable, to overthrow the government and establish an independent Northwestern
Confederation, a plot that involved freeing Confederate soldiers and stealing weapons,
did not make it a military manner. In Davis’s mind, Milligan could not have pled the
rights of war, for he was not engaged in acts of hostility against the federal government.
A close reading of the majority opinion in Milligan thus sheds some light on
where and for whom Davis intended it to apply. His repeated emphasis that Milligan was
not a “resident” of any “of the rebellious states” hints at the rule that residents of the
South were enemies with no constitutional rights to protect them against military
commissions. This would fall in line with the Prize Cases decision, in which he was a
member of the majority. There, the Court held that all who lived in enemy territory, were
no longer under the protection of the common law, but rather subject to the laws and
usages of war (international law). Additionally, Davis’s analysis of the locality of war
seems to have made clear that military commission were permissible only in the South.
Salmon P. Chase stated in his concurring opinion, that the Habeas Corpus Act of
1863 proved Congress meant for civilians to be tried in civilian courts, not military
courts, and therefore Milligan should have been released. As stated previously, this act
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allowed the detention of individuals only until a Grand Jury had met in the district where
they were held and if they were not indicted by the Grand Jury, the act required their
discharge.221 Chase also agreed with Davis that, “The holding of the Circuit and District
Courts of the United States in Indiana had been uninterrupted. The administration of the
laws in the Federal courts had remained unimpaired.”222 However, he disagreed with
Davis’s obiter dicta statement. Chase declared that Congress did in fact have the
authority to convene such military trials of civilians, even though it had not tried to do so
during the war. In opposition to Davis, Chase’s opinion stated:
In Indiana…the state was a military district, was the
theater of military operations, had been actually
invaded, and was constantly threatened with
invasion. We cannot doubt that, in such a time of
public danger, Congress had power, under the
Constitution, to provide for the organization of a
military commission, and for trial by that
commission of persons engaged in this conspiracy.
The fact that the Federal courts were open was
regarded by Congress as a sufficient reason for not
exercising the power; but that fact could not deprive
Congress of the right to exercise it.223

As a Radical Republican himself, Chase disagreed with Davis’ contention that Congress
did not possess the authority to establish military commissions. Alongside other
Radicals, he believed this stripping of Congressional power would be detrimental to
Reconstruction. At the end of his opinion, Chase remarked, “And we are unwilling to
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give our assent by silence to expressions of opinion which seem to us calculated…to
cripple the constitutional powers of the government, and to augment the public danger in
times of invasion and rebellion.”224 Chase seems to have been extremely suspicious of
Davis’s motivations when he used the word “calculated.” This may have inadvertently
planted the seed for Radicals to view the majority opinion as a partisan attack on
Reconstruction. As we have seen through a close reading of the majority opinion, Davis
did not intend for Milligan to remove the authority of military commissions in the South.
On the surface, however, it is entirely understandable why Radicals interpreted his
opinion negatively, in light of Davis’s swipe at congressional authority.
Apart from the opinion itself, there is very little documentary evidence as to Judge
Davis’ thoughts in regards to Milligan. The David Davis papers are incomplete,
especially for 1866, the year Milligan was decided. In fact, there are only a few known
family letters that even mention the Supreme Court case. On October 5, 1866, Sarah
Davis wrote a letter to her son, George Perrin Davis, and mentioned that his father “was
quite absorbed in his opinion…O, how I hope it may be finished tomorrow-for you dear
Father is quite worn-and dreams of it at night.”225 His wife even saw how important the
case was for him. On January 14, 1867, Mrs. Davis wrote her husband, informing him of
how “[T]he Pantagraph talks so harshly of the “Milligan case” and the decision of the
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five Judges that I will not send it.”226 The Republican-leaning Pantagraph had taken
exception to Milligan:
We do not complain of the court for having decided to
discharge Milligan; for after having determined that
military law did not prevail in Indiana at the time of his
arrest, and that he was therefore entitled to the benefit of
the statute, they could do no less. But with Chief Justice
Chase, we think the court should have stopped there, and
not volunteered opinions which give alarm to all but rebels
and their sympathizers.227
It seems as if the writer of this article was confused as to who made the obiter dita
statement. As we will see in a moment, according to Republicans it was Davis who
“volunteered opinions” that comforted “rebels and their sympathizers.” But in addition
to this, we will also see that public opinion in regards to Milligan varied along the
political spectrum.
On January 30, 1867, Judge Davis wrote his wife, alluding to the public reaction
to the published opinion. “Having been attacked so much in the papers, I thought that
Judge Rockwell would have written me. The opinion is not much talked of now…its fate
must depend on the judicial mind of the country.”228 Yet, as we have seen, we do know
that throughout the Civil War, Judge Davis was adamantly against the use of military
commissions in the North. In an 1866 letter to Williams Herndon, Davis remarked, “Mr.
Lincoln was advised and I so advised him, that the various military trials in the Northern
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and Border States, where the Courts were free and untrammeled, were unconstitutional
and wrong.”229
One can view Davis’s majority opinion in more than one light. On one hand,
Davis took an extreme Copperhead position when he struck down military commissions
in the North and upheld the Bill of Rights over the laws and usages of war. It is also
important to remember that throughout the war, Davis intervened on behalf of several
Copperheads. On the other hand, Davis held to his Whig roots and upheld the rule of law
in his majority opinion. As stated before, Lincoln believed that the exigencies of the
rebellion clothed him in enormous war powers in order to preserve the Union. Davis,
however, while upholding the majority of Lincoln’s war-time actions, believed that the
Constitution and the laws of the nation should have been upheld at all costs, thus his
opposition to military commissions in the North. Milligan can also be seen as a reflection
upon Davis’s anti-Partyism and his growing dislike of politics in general. As we have
seen, despite his opposition to Peace Democrats, he consistently intervened on their
behalf.
Davis’s mindset at this time is important to note, in order to frame his continued
judicial impartiality while on the bench. Before oral argument in Milligan, he wrote a
letter to his son stating, “I devote myself wholly to the duties of the bench and don’t
mingle with politicians at all.”230 A few months after oral argument, Davis wrote to
Julius Rockwell saying, “American politics don’t interest me much nowadays & I hardly
229
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read the newspapers enough to keep up with the current news of the day.”231 These two
letters illustrate Davis’s frame of mind before hearing Milligan and shortly before
drafting his majority opinion. It is my contention, therefore, that Davis remained
politically restrained during the course of Lambdin P. Milligan’s case.
As discussed in chapter 1, Davis was a Whig for most of his life. Whigs were
known for holding the opinion that the Constitution provided broad powers to the federal
government, including the creation of a national bank and funding the construction of
canals, roads, and railroads.232 Why then, did he in Milligan not only take a swipe at
executive wartime power but congressional power as well? After all, President Lincoln,
who also spent most of his life as a Whig, took no issue with the broad powers he
exercised during the war. The lack of documentary evidence in regard to Davis and
Milligan do nothing to help answer this question. Therefore, I offer the following
conjecture. As prairie lawyers, both Lincoln and Davis rarely encountered cases that
dealt with the United States Constitution. The majority of their practice encompassed the
common law and for Davis consisted largely of collection cases. Davis had not even
argued one single appellate case as opposed to Lincoln’s countless appellate cases.233 As
Mark Neely points out, even as president, Lincoln “rarely thought abstractly about the
Constitution and the laws…and did not characteristically reach first for a copy of the U.S.
Constitution when confronted with a political or social problem…because thinking in
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constitutional ways did not come naturally to him.”234 Davis, on the other hand, was
forced to become better acquainted with constitutional ways when he ascended to the
Supreme Court. His increasing breadth of constitutional history and principles, while a
justice, may have affected the Milligan decision’s legally liberal nature.
Other jurists saw Davis’ opinion as detrimental to post-war policy. Attorney John
Jay, grandson of Chief Justice John Jay, wrote to Chase stating, “If, as the public begin to
fear, [the Court’s] denial of the powers of Congress is any index to the view they are
prepared to take of the great questions that will come before them in reference to
Reconstruction, our situation is certainly a grave one.”235 Jay not only feared the short
term consequences of Milligan, but the long term decision-making by the Court in
regards to Reconstruction as well. If military commissions in the South were being
struck down, in his view, would the Court likewise strike down other Reconstruction
provisions? Again, we will see in the next chapter, that Davis actually upheld
Reconstruction measures in the South.
Democrats and Democratic newspapers, of course, immediately praised Davis’s
opinion. The New York World exclaimed, “The fact that the Supreme Court has escaped
the servile contamination of the times, and pronounces an independent opinion which
vindicates a party so traduced and maligned as the Democracy, is full of
encouragement.”236 The Enquirer wrote, “It has been decided by the Court that Congress
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has no power to authorize military commissions. The upright action of the Supreme
Court has inspired the country with new hope of a speedy tranquilization.”237 The Little
Rock Arkansas Gazette said that Milligan “encourages the belief that the Supreme Court
would become a barrier to the sweeping progress of a ruthless fanaticism.”238 Even some
Republican newspapers praised the opinion. The Louisville Democrat exclaimed, “that in
the worst days of party insanity and misrule, there is one conservative department of the
Government unawed and uninfluenced by the arbitrary power of Jacobinism. It is said
the Radicals, of the legal persuasion, grow sick at heart when they contemplate the
decision.”239 The New Orleans Picayune hailed the decision in almost Biblical
proportions. “This emerging of the Supreme Court above the atmosphere of partisan
strifes and tumultuous popular passions into the region of calm and unclouded justice is
the rising above the waters of the Ararat, on which the ark of the constitution may repose
in security.”240 The Springfield (Massachusetts) Republican saw Milligan as nothing
more than “a reaffirmation of the sacred right of trial by jury,” and it condemned
“popular alarm or partisan animosity.”241 The Democratic papers read Milligan as far
more sweeping as it actually was. For them, Democrats thought that no military
commissions would be allowed. Republicans also misread Davis’s opinion but in a
negative rather than a positive light. In their minds, there would be no military
commissions in the South to protect freedmen’s rights.
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No other historian has more accurately captured the contrasting responses to
Milligan between modern day legal scholars and Radical Republicans after it was
published than Charles Warren. In his 1935 book The Supreme Court in United States
History, Warren observed:
This famous decision has been long recognized as one of
the bulwarks of American liberty, that it is difficult to
realize now the storm of invective and opprobrium which
burst upon the Court at the time when it was first made
public. By the Reconstructionists the decision was
regarded as a reversion to the theory of constitutional
law…and they asserted that the Court had now joined
hands with President Johnson in an effort to destroy the
Congressional plans for Reconstruction.242

The Congressional plans for Reconstruction, of course, were to establish and protect civil
and political rights for freedmen throughout the South. Ironically misreading the
decision, Radical newspapers and politicians alike reviled Davis’s apparent attack on
their vision for a post-war South.
Much like John Jay, The Nation, a New York, Republican-leaning weekly
magazine, saw Milligan as an attack on Reconstruction and what he saw as legal
consequences for freedmen in the South. “Courts such as now exist in the South are no
more protection to the freedmen than if they did not exist.”243 Jay and The Nation
obviously understood that all-white, local Southern courts were not to be relied upon to
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uphold civil and legal rights for freedmen. The American Law Review opined on Davis’s
obiter dicta statement:
Had [the Court] in truth simply adhered to their plain duty
as Judges, they could have united in one opinion on this
most important case. Instead of approaching the subject of
the powers of the coordinate branches of the government as
one of great delicacy…they seemed eager to go beyond the
record…the more a case before the Supreme Court assumes
a political aspect, the more cautious should the Judges be to
confine themselves within their proper limits…244

The American Law Review clearly saw Davis’s opinion as a political
attack on Congressional Reconstruction.
The Republican New York Times stated:
The Supreme Court, we regret to find, throws the great
weight of its influence into the scale of those who assailed
the Union and step and step impugned the constitutionality
of nearly everything that was done to uphold it. The whole
Copperhead press exults over the decision.245

It is not clear whether the Times thought that Davis was taking the side of
the South or Peace Democrats. Either way, they accurately depicted the
Peace Democrat rapture over the decision.
Harper’s Weekly, which supported the Lincoln administration during the war,
wrote, “Like the Dred Scott decision, it is not a judicial opinion-it is a political act. The
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Indiana decision operates to deprive the freedmen in the late rebel States, whose laws
grievously outrage them, of the protection of the freedmen’s courts.”246 This Republican
newspaper probably comes the closest to representing how Radicals viewed Davis’s
majority opinion. Without military commissions (freedmen’s courts) in the South, their
newly acquired rights would be severely jeopardized.
In respects to Davis’s obiter dicta statement about congressional authority, the
Republican mouthpiece, Chicago Tribune stated, “Such a stepping aside from the case in
hand was, we think, unnecessary, uncalled for and unwise, and will do much to revive the
unfavorable impression of the tribunal.”247
Radical public opinion perceived Davis’ majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan as
a direct attack on Radical Republicans and their plans for Reconstruction in the South.
Southern public opinion perceived the opinion as a blanket of protection from post-war
military rule. Northern Democrat public opinion said it was a vindication of military
commissions such as in Milligan and Vallandigham’s cases. All three ends of the
political spectrum were wrong. I contend it was simply not the case that Davis intended
to limit Reconstruction in this way. In a letter to his brother-in-law, Julius Rockwell,
Davis explained, “not a word is said in the opinion about reconstruction, & the power [to
try by military commission] is conceded in the insurrectionary States.”248 It was not the
use of military commissions in the South that Davis opposed, it was their use in the
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North. Unfortunately, the Radicals in Congress did not have the opportunity to read this
letter and would, understandably, see Milligan as an attack on their plans for
Reconstruction. One could even make the argument that Davis was not accurately
characterizing his own opinion. However, as we will see in the next chapter, despite the
Radical Republicans view and reaction to Milligan as an attack on Congressional
Reconstruction, Davis’s voting record in subsequent Supreme Court cases allowed
military commissions to remain intact in the Reconstruction South.

117

CHAPTER V
“THE CONSTITUTIONAL TWADDLE OF MR. JUSTICE DAVIS”249:
EX PARTE MILLIGAN AND RECONSTRUCTION

Post-war reconciliation is invariably challenging, whatever the nature of the
conflict. But it is exceptionally difficult in the aftermath of civil wars. Conflict over
shared territory, a shared political system, or competing ideologies produces formidable
ongoing problems regardless of whether civil war results in separation or reunion. For
the American Civil War, one of the post-war conflicts would be over David Davis’s
majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan and its interpretation by Radical Republicans.250 In
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order to understand the Radical reaction to Milligan it is necessary first to understand
exactly what the role of military commissions were during Reconstruction. This will
allow a clearer understanding of why Radicals were so concerned over Davis’s reprimand
of military commissions and why they understandably took action against the Supreme
Court, leading to a more partisan and politically unstable environment during
Reconstruction.
Milligan was handed down in the aftermath of Lincoln’s assassination and in the
early phases of Presidential Reconstruction. As a driving issue, race eventually became a
constitutional issue of Reconstruction.251 Radical Republicans, such as Thaddeus
Stephens, argued that the Confederacy was an “enemy nation” and thus the laws of war
dictated military occupation by Union troops. Though they agreed with Stevens that the
laws of war held between the armed forces of the Union so-called and those of the socalled Confederacy. Moderate Republicans, like President Lincoln, maintained that
nevertheless, the Southern states had never left the Union thus entitling them to a full
restoration of their political and legal rights, with the proviso of abolishing slavery, a
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certain percentage taking a test oath, and several other conditions.252 Lincoln had
consistently maintained that secession was illegal, and he could not very well hold it was
legal now that the war was coming to an end.
Initially, President Johnson favored leniency when it came to readmitting the
Southern states. Not only did he offer amnesty to southerners who took a loyalty oath,
but he also allowed many former Confederates back into political office. He did require
the Southern states to ratify the 13th Amendment though. This meant that the political
rights of the freedmen would be left to Southern state governments. “Black Codes” were
quickly passed by Southern state legislatures which effectively restricted their political
and economic rights by establishing a system of sharecropping and racial segregation.253
As W.E.B. Dubois best described it, “The slave went free; stood a brief moment in the
sun; then moved back again toward slavery.”254
Radical and some moderate Republicans in Congress had alternative plans for
Reconstruction. Along with refusing to seat Southerners in their respective state
governments, on April 9, 1866, three days after the Supreme Court decided Milligan,
Congress passed the Civil Rights bill and on July 16, the Freedmen’s Bureau bill, both
over Johnson’s veto.255 The Radicals also believed that military occupation and military
law were the only mechanisms that could protect the freedmen’s newly acquired political
rights. In fact, a provision of the Freedman’s Bureau Act provided for military
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commissions to protect the rights of Black in the South.256 In his famous “Swing ‘Round
the Circle,” Johnson campaigned in support of his Reconstruction plan and lambasted
Congress for attempting to destroy it. Johnson’s actions made it seem to a majority of
Northerners that winning the war was being given away. As a result, the 1866
congressional elections led to a landslide victory for Radicals, thus ending Presidential
Reconstruction and ushering in Congressional Reconstruction.257
A part of this military occupation was the use of military commissions to try
Southern civilians. Despite Milligan’s assertion that military commissions were
unconstitutional when the civilian courts were open and functioning, military trials of
civilians continued in the Reconstruction South. Mark Neely provides the following
number of trials per year after the Milligan decision: 229 in 1866, 181 in 1867, and 104
in 1868.258 What happened here? It was by no means the first time that another branch of
government ignored a Supreme Court decision. Lincoln blatantly ignored the Taney
Court on civil liberty issues in Ex parte Merryman.259
Less well known are the justifications given by Congressional Radicals for
ignoring Milligan after the war. Understanding the partisanship in a post-Civil War
America is vital to this story. Michael W. Fitzgerald’s “Reconstruction Politics and the
Politics of Reconstruction” explores how corruption and partisanship undermined the
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effectiveness of the Reconstruction governments.260 The partisanship that Fitzgerald
uncovers led Radicals to see Davis’s majority opinion as an attack on their plans for
Reconstruction. In doing so, Congress took several steps to reduce the power of the
Supreme Court which only contributed to the political instability of Reconstruction.
Justice Chase and his Radical Republican colleagues had strongly opposed
President Lincoln’s Reconstruction policy of reuniting the United States. In opposition to
Lincoln’s 10% plan back in 1864, the Radicals proposed the Ironclad Oath which
prevented anyone who had supported the Confederacy from voting in Southern elections.
Lincoln quickly pocket-vetoed the Wade-Davis bill, which made southern state
readmittance to the Union contingent on taking the Ironclad Oath itself.261 The Radicals
continued to lobby for a more aggressive war effort, the end of slavery, and the total
destruction of the Confederacy. After the 1866 elections and after expelling the former
Confederate Southern Congressmen in the 39th Congress they had a majority of nearly 3
to 1 in the House, nearly 4 to 1 in the Senate, and took control of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction. Johnson ignored this Radical sweep and continued to insist on Southern
state re-admittance. He called for a “return to the ancient landmarks” in order to assure
“the perpetuity of our free institutions,” and a restoration of “fraternal feeling.”262 The
only problem with this “perpetuity of our free institutions” was an underlying condition
that freedmen be left to the mercy of local southern law. Thus, there was a need (from
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the Radical perspective) for judicial supervision in the South through the continued use of
military commissions.
The United States Army played a vital role during Reconstruction. Their main
purpose was to maintain law and order, as well as to protect freedmen and white
Republicans from resentful, violent Southerners. The horrendous acts of the Klu Klux
Klan nearly turned the South into a terrorist state in which lynching and voter
intimidation were prevalent.263 The task of putting the lid on this violence fell on the
shoulders of the U.S. Army, with the assistance of the Freedmen’s Bureau. Soldiers were
inadequate to handle the work load however. Two hundred-thousand troops were
stationed in the South in 1865. By April 1866, there were less than forty-thousand troops
and in October 1866 only twenty-thousand.264 Maintaining the law proved just as
challenging as maintaining order. Thus military commissions were put into place so that
law and order could be maintained. From the end of the war until January 1, 1869, there
were 1,435 military trials of civilians in the South.265 Northern Republicans such as
Thaddeus Stevens saw these tribunals as the only option to maintain a fair justice system
for blacks in the face of local Southern judges and juries, while Southerners viewed them
as a continuation of Republican tyranny.266
We will see what would become an emerging constitutional conflict not only
between the Radical Republicans and President Johnson but also between the Radical

Detlev F. Vagts, “Military Commissions: The Forgotten Reconstruction Chapter,” American
University International Law Review 23, no. 2 (2007): 234.
264
Vagts, “Military Commissions,” 236-237.
265
Neely, The Fate of Liberty, 176.
266
Vagts, “Military Commissions,” 244-245.
263

123

Republicans and the Supreme Court, especially in response to David Davis’s majority
opinion in Ex parte Milligan. To be sure, based on his own racist tendencies Davis
opposed such Radical Reconstruction ideas of black suffrage and equality. Even though
he labeled himself a Republican, he leaned conservative Republican at best. Much later,
in an 1868 letter to Massachusetts Republican Congressman Julius Rockwell, Judge
Davis wrote, “The election last week passed off quietly but when I saw the degraded
ignorance of the poor creatures, who were voting…I felt sad…Negro suffrage…may
prove a measure of wisdom and good statesmanship, but I don’t believe it.”267 This
tracks with what we have already seen with Davis’s racial prejudices.
Just weeks before Davis issued his opinion in Ex parte Milligan, the election of
1866 resulted in a landslide victory for Radical Republicans. Consequently, Milligan was
just as important for freedmen as it was for white civil liberties. Confident of their new
majorities, the newly elected Radicals in Congress passed several pieces of legislation
stripping the Supreme Court of its jurisdictional and appellate powers, in order to
preserve their Reconstruction plans and to keep the Court at bay. These attacks on the
Supreme Court by Radical Republicans came out of their understanding of Milligan’s
majority opinion which was that it struck down military commissions in Reconstruction
South.
The actions that the Radicals took in response to Milligan included reducing its
members and limiting its appellate jurisdiction over military commissions in the South.
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These actions only made Reconstruction’s politics more partisan. In an almost prophetic
manner regarding Davis’s obiter dicta statement about Congressional authority to
establish military commissions, Radical Republican Congressman James F. Wilson of
Iowa declared, “[T]his is a piece of judicial impertinence which we are not bound to
respect. No such question was before the record in treating of it.”268 The “question” that
Wilson referred to was of course Davis’s obiter dicta statement. The Congressman went
on to explain that Milligan did not present any legal point that would justify Davis in
examining the powers of Congress.
The Radical Republicans immediately saw Milligan as a threat to their plans for
Reconstruction. According to a correspondent from the Newark Evening Courier:
Every Republican member of Congress with whom I have
conferred on the subject is out and out for abolishing the
Supreme Court at once upon the ground that if Congress
does not abolish it, it will abolish Congress. I find the
decision of the whole court is as offensive to the
Republicans of Congress as that of the majority.269

In the minds of Radical Republicans, their fears were soon realized. Once Davis’s
opinion was published, President Johnson immediately ordered all trials of civilians by
military commissions dismissed. United States District Court Judge Hall similarly
released four men convicted by a military commission in South Carolina. The Radicals
were no less distressed when Dr. Samuel Mudd, one of the Lincoln assassination
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conspirators who had been convicted by a military commission, applied for a writ of
habeas corpus to Chief Justice Chase.270 Even though Chase denied the application
because he could not issue a writ outside of his own Circuit, the Radicals drafted a bill on
January 3, 1867 that would repeal the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863, “to prevent
the Supreme Court from releasing and discharging the assassins of Mr. Lincoln and the
conspirators to release the rebel prisoners [Milligan, et al.] at Camp Douglas in
Chicago.”271
Debate over this bill and subsequent bills regarding military reconstruction during
the 39th Congress often directly addressed Davis’s opinion. Senator Reverdy Johnson
defended the Court by stating, “The opinion of the majority was given by a man whose
character, public and private, stands beyond possible reproach.”272 In response, leading
Radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens declared Milligan to be a “most injurious decision
[that] has rendered immediate action by Congress upon the question of the establishment
of governments in the rebel States absolutely indispensable.”273 Stevens went on to
reason that Davis’s decision effectively took away every legal protection for loyal
persons, black or white, who resided in the South. Radical Congressman John A.
Bingham of Ohio suggested, “sweeping away at once the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in
all cases.”274 While these heated debates continued over repealing the Habeas Corpus

270

Warren, The Supreme Court, 444.
Committee on the Judiciary, 39th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Globe: 249.
272
Reverdy Johnson speaking on Milligan on December 20, 1866, 39th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Congressional Globe: 210.
273
Thaddeus Stevens speaking on Milligan on January 3, 1867, 39th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Congressional Globe: 251.
274
John A. Bingham speaking on Milligan on January 3, 1867, 39th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Congressional Globe: 249.
271

126

Act of 1863, the New York Herald opined, “This bill, if passed into a law, will practically
relieve the Supreme Court of any further interference with Congress in the business of
Southern Reconstruction.”275 In the end, the bill to repeal the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863
did not receive enough support, even among moderate Republicans. The Radicals,
however, were not deterred in their effort to push back on a perceived threat from the
Supreme Court.
The next Radical foray against the Supreme Court was reducing the number of
justices on the bench through the Act of July 23, 1866. The number of justices on the
Court was originally fixed at six in 1789, had been increased to seven in 1807, to nine in
1837, and to ten by 1863. Having suffered through illness all of the December term,
Justice Catron died in May 1865. As a result of the Act, President Johnson did not make
a nomination to fill his seat before the next term. Radical Republican James F. Wilson of
Iowa, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, introduced H.R. 334 on February 26, 1866
which, if adopted, would fix the number of justices on the Court at eight members.276
Congressman Wilson commented, “I know that some of the members of that court are
confirmed in that opinion that the court is too large. I should be in favor myself…of still
further reducing the number if another vacancy now existed.”277 Wilson did not make it
clear which justices shared in his view that the court was too large, but one may
conjecture that Chase and his Republican colleagues feared whomever Johnson might
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appoint. Without any debate, the House unanimously voted to send H.R. 334 to the
Senate where on March 8th the bill was placed into the hands of the Judiciary Committee
for three months.278
On July 10th, Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull from Illinois reported an
amendment that would reduce the Court to seven members. The amended bill was passed
and sent back to the House.279 On July 18, The House agreed on the amendment and the
bill was passed, 78 Republican votes to 41 Democrat votes.280 The final version read,
“No vacancy in the office of associate justice of the supreme court shall be filled by
appointment until the number of associate justices shall be reduced to six; and thereafter
the said supreme court shall consist of a chief justice of the United States Supreme and
six associate justices.”281
This attack, of course, effectively prevented President Johnson from appointing
any justices to the Supreme Court who would have tended to uphold his Reconstruction
policy of returning political power to the Southern states. Even Justice Davis noted the
Republicans’ motivations behind the bill. In a letter to his brother-in-law Julius Rockwell
he wrote, “But I have supposed the bill was passed simply to prevent the Presdt fr (sic)
appointing Supreme Judges.”282 Interestingly enough, Johnson nominated Henry
Stanbery to take Justice Catron’s place on April 16th. While working in the Attorney
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General’s office, Stanbery actually had written Johnson’s March 27 veto of the Civil
Rights Bill, a bill which defined U.S. citizenship and affirmed that all citizens were
equally protected under the law.283 The Radicals knew how disastrous his confirmation
would be to their own Reconstruction plans, and thus let the Stanbery nomination
stagnate in the Senate until the Act of July 23 was passed, eliminating this possible threat.
However, as Charles Fairman points out in History of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Reconstruction and Reunion:
As an expedient to preclude appointments by President
Johnson, the reduction of seven was unnecessary. In a
Senate where the Republicans strength was well over twice
that of Democrats and Johnson’s friends combined,
confirmation of any unsatisfactory nominee could be
prevented.284

Even though reducing the number of justices on the Supreme Court was unnecessary
based on the Republicans’ ability to deny confirmation, it is again understandable why
the Radicals took these measures. But this was not yet enough to protect freedmen in the
South from all white juries and judges.
Leading Radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens commented on Milligan in
January 1867, saying, “That decision although in terms not as infamous as the Dred Scott
decision, is yet far more dangerous in its operation upon the lives and liberties of the
loyal men of this country.”285 In order to protect those lives and liberties of Unionists
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and freedmen, Stevens introduced H.R. 1143 in January 1867 for the creation of “military
districts…to give protection, to suppress disorder, and to cause criminals to be punishedby the local courts or, if he judged necessary, by military commission.”286 Stevens
introduced this bill based on his belief in the power of conquerors under the law of
nations. Radical Republican Senator Zachariah Chandler of Michigan believed that the
laws of war had given Lincoln the authority to appoint military governors during the war
and concluded that those same laws of war gave Congress the power to reorganize the
former Confederate states.287
Kentucky Democrat Lawrence S. Trimble objected to such measures. Referring
to Milligan, which at this point had been decided the previous year, he prayed that the
Court might “continue…as the shield and protector of the weak and the innocent through
all time.”288 In his mind, the “weak and the innocent” were white southerners. Elijah
Hise, also a Democrat from Kentucky, stated that the “only hope of the preservation of a
free Government is in the decisions of the Supreme Court.”289 Charles Eldridge of
Wisconsin said that Milligan had brought “glad tidings to the depressed and despairing
people.”290 Frederick Pike of Maine supported the Steven’s bill, insisting that Congress
should set up new governments in the South. However, he “noticed that a decision
[Milligan] is threatened against such action. But the court should recollect that it has had
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bad luck with its political decisions. The people thus far have preferred to govern the
country themselves and let the court attend to its law business.”291 It seems that Pike, like
many of his Radical colleagues, also thought of Davis’s majority opinion as a political
maneuver to take away Congress’s ability to set up military rule in the South. Ironically
for Davis, as he saw it, he was in fact attending to “law business” rather than issuing a
political decision.
On the very last day of the 39th Congress, March 2, 1867, Steven’s bill was passed
over Johnson’s veto. The first of four Reconstruction Acts, it divided the ten former
Confederate states into five military districts and laid out the conditions for which their
representatives would be re-admitted to Congress. One such condition included the
ratification of the 14th Amendment and passage of new state constitutions that
incorporated the right to vote. It also laid the framework for military commissions.292 It
appears then that the Radicals thought they were responding to Milligan’s attempt at
curtailing what they saw as their constitutionally granted authority to establish order in
the former rebel states and most importantly ensure the safety and liberty of freedmen.
By legislating military commissions in both the Freedman’s Bureau Act and Military
Reconstruction Act in response to Milligan and reducing the number of justices to
prevent Johnson from appointing anyone who might be opposed to Congressional
Reconstruction, the Radicals took extreme but understandable measures in order to
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protect freedmen from an all-white Southern judicial system that would most assuredly
be opposed toward their newly acquired rights.
One particularly prominent military commission that occurred under the First
Reconstruction Act took place in November 1867, about a year after Davis released his
opinion. William McCardle, the editor of the Vicksburg Times, was tried by a military
commission for inciting insurrection and urging white southerners to “resist despotism
and despots” and to maintain “the rights of the people who were born free.”293 On
November 6, he threatened to publish the names of anyone who planned to vote in the
elections under the state’s Reconstruction laws. Four charges were issued against him:
(1) disturbance of the public peace in violation of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1867,
(2) inciting insurrection, disorder, and violence, (3) libel, and (4) impeding reconstruction
of the Southern states. Upon his arrest, McCardle filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Circuit Court of the Southern District of Mississippi. Believing that the Military
Reconstruction Act of March 2, which authorized cases to be brought before a military
commission instead of a judge or jury, negated his authority to try McCardle, the judge
remanded him back into military custody on November 25. McCardle appealed to the
Supreme Court on December 23, 1867. Certiorari was granted and arguments were
scheduled for the first Monday in March 1868 and spanned March 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 9th.294
McCardle’s appeal relied on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 which, ironically, granted
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appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to review habeas corpus cases where former
slaves were being held illegally.295
Fearing that the Supreme Court would declare the Reconstruction Act
unconstitutional, the Radicals hurried a bill through while the Court took the case under
advisement on March 9. The Act of March 27, 1868 stated, “The act approved February
5, 1867, entitled 'An act to amend an act to establish the judicial courts of the United
States, approved September 24, 1789, as authorized an appeal from the judgment of the
Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of the United States, or the exercise of any such
jurisdiction by said Supreme Court, on appeals which have been, or may hereafter be
taken, be, and the same is hereby repealed. "296 This action by the Radicals, in effect,
revoked the Court’s authority to review McCardle’s case.
Stepping back briefly, the opening of the second session of the 40th Congress saw
significant Radical activity towards the Court. Representative John Bingham of Ohio
introduced a measure on January 13, 1868 that required the vote of two-thirds of the full
Court to invalidate an Act of Congress. Bingham concluded that the Court had “dared to
descend from its high place in the discussion and decision of purely judicial questions to
the settlement of political questions which it has no more right to decide for the American
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people than has the Court of St. Petersburg.”297 It is obvious that Davis’s obiter dicta
statement in Milligan greatly concerned the gentleman from Ohio. For him, the ability of
the Supreme Court to hold a Congressional act unconstitutional was much too easy, as
illustrated by Davis’s statement regarding Congressional authority to establish military
commissions. The bill briefly remained in the Senate but soon was forgotten due to
Andrew Johnson’s impeachment.
Republican Lyman Trumbull introduced S. 163 on December 4, 1867, which
called for five Justices instead of six that would suffice for a quorum.298 The House
Judiciary Committee adopted Bingham’s measure requiring a two-thirds majority vote to
have an Act of Congress declared unconstitutional. This, however, only gained the
support of twenty-five Radicals. The bill was defeated 116 to 39.299 Another bill was
introduced by Radical George Williams of Oregon, one that would this time curb the
Supreme Court. S. 213 started out as a bill to amend the Judiciary Act by allowing the
Supreme Court to review cases under the internal revenue laws.300 When it reached the
House, Radical Republican James F. Wilson added an amendment that repealed the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.301 Back in the Senate, it was passed 32 to 6.302 The bill was
passed over President Johnson’s veto on March 27, 1868.303
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Because Chief Justice Chase concluded that Congress had complete constitutional
authority to regulate the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction even though the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867 lawfully allowed McCardle’s appeal, Ex parte McCardle was unanimously
dismissed on April 12 before an opinion could be rendered. In their minds, the Radical
Republicans had gained yet another victory in a range war with the Supreme Court and
successfully protected their military apparatus for the preservation of black equality
before the law in the new South.
But as this thesis has contended all along, David Davis did not intend for Milligan
to strike down military commissions in the Reconstruction South. Exactly what were
Judge Davis’ thoughts on Reconstruction in the context of Milligan? Again,
documentary evidence in the form of correspondence or diaries is inconclusive. The only
exception is the February 27th letter to his brother-in-law, Julius Rockwell, in which
Davis explained, “not a word is said in the opinion about reconstruction, & the power [to
try by military commission] is conceded in the insurrectionary States.”304 Using this
letter as proof of Davis’ thoughts on Reconstruction could be somewhat precarious
however. Corroborating evidence for his stance on Reconstruction, therefore, may be
found in Supreme Court decisions that followed Milligan.
After Congress passed the First Reconstruction Act on March 2, 1867, the state of
Mississippi petitioned the Supreme Court for an injunction to prevent President Johnson
from enforcing it. In Mississippi v. Johnson, the Court unanimously stated that it did not
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possess the authority to interfere with the President’s constitutional duty of executing the
laws of Congress: “Neither [Congress or the President] can be restrained in its action by
the judicial departments; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper cases,
subject to its cognizance.”305 In other words, according to the Court, it could not tell the
President how to prospectively perform his executive duties, but it could review the acts
stemming from his executive duties after they were performed.
The following month, the states of Georgia and Mississippi, again in an attempt to
curb the Reconstruction Act, filed suit against Secretary of War Edwin Stanton for
injunctive relief. As with Mississippi v. Johnson, the Supreme Court unanimously
dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction to decide a political issue. The cases brought
before the Court did not involve questions of persons or property but rather a political
question of whether the federal government could dissolve a state government and
replace it with a new one prescribed under military rule. “That these matters, both as
stated in the body of the bill, and, in the prayers for relief, call for the judgment of the
court upon political questions, and, upon rights, not of persons or property, but of a
political character, will hardly be denied.”306 This ruling, of which Davis was a part of, is
entirely consistent with the central argument of this thesis. It shows that (1) Davis upheld
military commissions in the South within the Reconstruction Act, which was being
challenged in this case and (2) by refusing to hear a case involving a political question, he
continued to maintain a nonpartisan mindset while on the bench.
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It seems obvious that Milligan’s reception would fall along party lines.
Democrats praised Davis’s majority opinion for its defense of civil liberties during
wartime. Radical Republicans on the other hand did not see it that way. For them, their
most important instrument in protecting freedmen in the post-war South had just been
struck down by a Supreme Court Justice that had spent the war intervening on behalf of
anti-Black, Southern sympathizers. This thesis, however, has argued that Davis’s
wartime record of intervening on behalf of Copperheads who were being tried by the
military in the North while at the same time supporting the war effort in the South,
together with his February 27, 1867 letter to Julius Rockwell and the Court’s unanimous
rejection to review military commissions in Ex parte McCardle, Mississippi v. Johnson,
and Georgia v. Stanton reveals that Davis did not intend for Milligan to apply to the
South. While he himself shared many of the same racial prejudices as Copperheads, he
wholly believed in the Union and equally believed that the law should be applied to those
who supported the war and to those who opposed it. Most importantly, his judicial
impartiality in Ex parte Milligan, despite his own racial prejudices, left military
commissions in the South intact.
David Davis served on the Supreme Court until 1877. A year before, Rutherford
B. Hayes, Republican Governor from Ohio ran against Samuel Tilden, the Democratic
Governor of New York. Several voting irregularities occurred throughout the country
during the fall election which resulted in a disputed single vote in the Electoral College.
In order to remedy the brewing Constitutional crisis, Congress appointed a fifteenmember Electoral Commission to resolve the disputed vote. Davis was appointed as the
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only Independent member which would give him the deciding vote. Never in the history
of the United States had one individual been given the opportunity to choose a president.
On January 18, 1877, the Illinois legislature elected Davis to the United States Senate
with every single Democrat vote and absolutely no Republican vote. The Democrats’
ploy to gain Davis’s vote backfired. Refusing to sit on the Commission and make a
decision, Justice Joseph Bradley took Davis’s place and gave the election to Hayes.307
On March 5, 1877, the same day Hayes was inaugurated, Davis resigned from the
Supreme Court and took the oath as United States Senator. Davis’s most lasting impact
as a Senator was in judicial reform. He wrote a bill to create a Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeal. This would effectively relieve the Supreme Court from its burdensome caseload,
of which he was intimately familiar with. The bill was passed in the Senate but failed in
the House. On July 2, 1881, President Garfield was mortally shot by a disgruntled
officer-seeker. Two months later, the president succumbed to his wounds and died.
Vice-President Chester A. Arthur assumed the Presidency, leaving the Senate president’s
seat vacant. Ironically, Davis who had been elected to the Senate unanimously by
Democrats, was unanimously elected president pro tempore by Republicans. As the
leader of the Senate he was well liked by both sides of the isles as he remained politically
neutral, much like he had been on the Supreme Court.308
When his term was up, Davis did not seek reelection. In March of 1883, he
retired from the Senate and returned to his home in Bloomington, Illinois. Davis’s
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remaining years were fairly quiet. In 1884 he was elected president of the Illinois State
Bar Association and in November of 1885 delivered the eulogy for John Stuart, an old 8th
Circuit colleague of his and Lincoln. Shortly after delivering this address, Davis fell
gravely ill. It was only then that doctors finally realized that the disease he had been
battling for so many years was diabetes. His condition progressively worsened over the
spring and on June 20 Davis slipped into a coma. He remained alive but unconscious
until June 26, 1886, when he died. Four days later, six pallbearers including Robert Todd
Lincoln and Adlai E. Stevenson, carried Davis’s body to Evergreen Cemetery. The
church bells of Bloomington rang out in honor of the jurist and statesman.309

309

King, Lincoln’s Manager, 306-307.

139

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
“The pen that writes the judgment of the Court, will be mightier
for good or for evil than any sword that ever was
wielded by mortal arm.”310

When David Davis returned to his home in Bloomington, Illinois during the
summer of 1866 to write his majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan, he was well aware of
its legal significance. Milligan’s historical significance was yet to be written by
historians however. This study has attempted to examine the latter, specifically in
regards to Civil War and Reconstruction politics. I have argued that the relevancy and
historical importance of Ex parte Milligan is not in the opinion itself, but rather in its
interpretation by Radical Republicans and how it was the pinnacle of Davis’s maturation
as a civil libertarian. The Radical Republican view that Milligan voided military
commissions in the South led the Radicals in Congress to launch several attacks against
the Supreme Court, thus reflecting and contributing to the existing partisanship of
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Reconstruction. Yet, as the events of Reconstruction played out, their actions were
certainly justified.
David Davis’s early life as a Whig instilled in him an opposition to partisan
politics which he carried with him for the rest of his life. Yet he managed Lincoln’s
campaign in 1860 and was a fervent Whig state legislator. On the other hand, as a circuit
court judge and Supreme Court justice, he was a constant guardian of the law and justice
for all, regardless of party affiliation. From this perspective, we can see two different
sides to Davis. He was an avid partisan politician off the bench but was a model of
judicial impartiality when on the bench. As a Supreme Court justice, Davis became
increasingly concerned with the growing civil liberties issues during the Civil War,
specifically in the North. On several occasions Davis directly intervened on behalf of
Peace Democrats who faced trial by military commissions. Among those were the
defendants in the Charleston, Illinois riots and Chicago Times editor Wilber Storey. In
addition, Davis personally shared his concerns with Lincoln, warning him of the dubious
nature of military commissions in the North. But while adamantly opposed to Lincoln’s
actions in the North, he consistently upheld his actions in the South as seen in the Prize
Cases. Davis’s opposition to the Emancipation Proclamation can be explained by his
racial prejudices but could also be used to argue that he was predisposed to strike down
military commissions in the South. As we have seen, Davis chose to show judicial
impartiality by setting aside his racial prejudices and leaving military courts intact as a
legal safeguard for freedmen.
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With the war finally over, Ex parte Milligan offered Davis a chance to finally
make a lasting statement on the legality of military commissions in the North. Davis’s
majority opinion was just that: a referendum on military trials of civilians in the North.
Throughout the opinion, as he had during the war, Davis upheld the Lincoln
administration’s war effort in the rebellious states. He made a clear distinction between
North and South in this manner. According to Davis’s view, Indiana was not in a state of
war that justified martial law and therefore did not justify the use of military
commissions. This point, of course, could be an entire thesis study unto itself.
Nonetheless, Davis went on to make an obiter dicta statement saying that even if
Congress had authorized these military commissions in the North, they did not have
Constitutional power to do so. It was therefore understandable that Radicals saw Davis’s
opinion as an attack on Radical Reconstruction policy, specifically in regards to using
military commissions as a safeguard for freedmen’s legal rights. We can also understand
why it was that Radicals thought it necessary to reduce the number of justices on the
Court and strip it of its jurisdictional powers to hear military commission cases.
If Milligan holds any lesson for us today, it is a political lesson rather than a legal
lesson. This political lesson does not come from the Radicals though. Again, one can
certainly understand why they viewed Milligan the way they did. If they thought that
military commissions in the South were being struck down by the Supreme Court, their
ability to protect freedmen’s rights in a post-war Southern justice system would have
been severely jeopardized. In other words, the lack of military commissions meant
freedmen would surely have been at the mercy of all-white courts. To label the Radical’s
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attacks on the Supreme Court in the aftermath of Milligan, then, is to diminish and
undermine their concerns and goals of racial equality in Reconstruction South.
For purposes of this study, therefore, the lesson lies with David Davis himself.
To be sure, Davis showed great judicial impartiality in his majority opinion. Considering
his own racial prejudices, his opposition to emancipation and black equality, and to
Radical Republicans, he very well could have extended his condemnation of military
commissions into the South; yet he did not. He strongly opposed Peace Democrats as
well, yet he consistently took up the cause of Peace Democrats, such as Lambdin P.
Milligan, whose civil liberties, he held, were violated during the war. Davis was able to
set aside the same partisan politics he had loathed his entire life and rule on his legal
convictions.
It would be naïve to think that judges do not come to the bench without their own
personal political persuasions and that those political persuasions do not enter into their
minds as they consider the cases before them. In 2000, Bush v. Gore saw the Supreme
Court vote down strictly party lines, effectively ushering in arguably one of the most
economically and diplomatically devastating administrations in United States history.
More recently, arguments over Justice Scalia’s replacement have revolved around party
politics rather than substantive judicial qualifications. As it turns out, President Obama’s
nominee to replace Justice Scalia understands the importance of being both a statesman
and jurist. During a press conference at the White House on March 16, nominee Judge
Merrick Garland stated, “The life of public service is as much a gift to the person who
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serves as it is to those he is serving.”311 Long before Judge Garland made this statement,
Judge Davis lived it.
In short, members of the judiciary, at all levels, should take care not to allow their
political ideologies to overshadow the pursuit of justice. In a world of injustice and toxic
partisanship, the judicial system can and should be a great equalizer, but we must first
seek to re-instill a sense of public service, not only among those who interpret the law but
those who make the law. Until then, David Davis’s life and judicial career stands as an
example of wisdom and statesmanship.
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